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Non-Governmental Organizations at
United Nations-Sponsored World
Conferences: A Framework for
Participation Reform
JEFFREY ANDREW HARTWICK*
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have grown
increasingly powerful and influential at international conferences
sponsored by the United Nations. For instance, NGO activity was
particularly prominent at the 2001 UN World Conference Against
Racism (WCAR) in Durban, South Africa. This conference,
however, was also an example of excessive NGO participation and
harmful influence. At Durban, the NGO Forum (Forum) was
marked by episodes of intolerance and anti-Semitism. The Forum
produced unbalanced and impractical final documents that
legitimized conference delegates pursuing anti-Western or anti-
Israeli agendas.
How then can excessive and detrimental NGO influence at
UN-sponsored world conferences be lessened to encourage
productive activity and ensure the rightful primacy of nation-
states? This Article will address this fundamental question. Part II
looks at NGOs generally and the rules governing their interaction
within the UN conference system. Part III examines the WCAR at
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Durban, a recent example of NGO-instigated chaos. Part IV
examines two opposing schools of thought regarding the role of
NGOs in the international system. One view favors an enlarged
role for NGOs, the other a restricted role. The two camps do not
provide an adequate framework to regulate NGO behavior,
however. Part V advocates an overhaul of the NGO accreditation
and participation framework in the UN to reduce NGO excesses,
proposing seven reforms. Part VI applies six of these proposed
solutions to a future UN WCAR to determine their practicality
and viability. Part VII concludes that the suggested reforms would
significantly improve a currently broken UN system for regulating
NGO participation at conferences. These reforms would enable
NGOs to take part in conferences in a meaningful way, reduce
damaging excesses, and ensure the primacy of nation-states.
II. NONGOVERNMETAL ORGANIZATIONS
A. Definition and History
Non-governmental organizations are defined as "private
organizations.., not established by a government or by inter-
governmental agreement, which are capable of playing a role in
international affairs by virtue of their activities, and whose
members enjoy independent voting rights."' NGOs can be further
subdivided into "national" or "international." A national NGO is
involved with issues within a particular state, while an
international NGO contends with matters across borders.'
An example of a national NGO is the National Rifle
Association, an American group concerned about Second
Amendment rights and the promotion of hunting and shooting
sports.
An example of an international NGO is Amnesty
International, a human rights organization with chapters in many
nations throughout the world. For the purposes of this study, the
term "NGOs" includes not only these traditional advocacy or
public interest groups, both national and international, but also
business, associational, and union groups.
1. Hermann H. K. Rechenberg, Non-Governmental Organizations, 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 612, 612 (1992).
2. Id.
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NGOs are not a new phenomenon. The Roman Catholic
Church is among the first NGOs.3 NGOs grew in number and
stature during the nineteenth century, focusing mostly on issues of
slavery, peace, and labor.4 NGO prominence increased after the
end of the Second World War, when the UN officially recognized
the status and importance of NGOs in Article 71 of the UN
Charter.'
Since the 1970s, NGO influence and participation in
international bodies have increased dramatically. International
NGOs, such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International, have
taken part in international conferences, influenced international
agreements, and successfully promoted public awareness of the
issues they lobby and support.
NGOs are important for a number of reasons. First, they
provide valuable technical expertise and experience in complex
fields like climate change and humanitarian relief. Second, they
bring public attention to issues that states ignored. For example,
international NGOs were instrumental in the enactment of the
Mine Bare Treaty by publicizing the issue and getting many states
to sign a comprehensive global treaty banning the use and
manufacture of certain kinds of mines.'
Third, NGOs serve an educational function. They hold
seminars and briefings, and draft policy papers. International
bureaucrats and elites, who make important decisions in areas of
NGO concern, are better informed because of NGO efforts.
Fourth, some consider NGOs the conscience of international civil
society whose views represent those of world populations
Fifth, NGOs bring claims of victims before certain
international commissions and tribunals, such as the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-
3. Steve Charnovitz, Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International
Governance, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 183, 190-91 (1997).
4. See id. at 191-94.
5. See U.N. CHARTER art. 71.
6. Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of
Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil Society, 11 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 91, 104-08 (2000) [hereinafter Anderson 11.
7. See Press Release, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Secretary-
General Calls on NGOs to Create Worldwide Anti-Racism Movement (Aug. 30, 2001),
U.N. Doe. SG/SM/7926, available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2
0 01 /
sgsm7926.doc.htm. [hereinafter Kofi Annan Press Release].
2003]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
American Court of Human Rights (Inter-American Court).' Sixth,
some NGOs serve on state delegations involved in negotiating and
formulating international conventions.' This occurred during the
UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio
Conference), when some state delegations included NGO
representatives. Representatives of one NGO negotiated on
behalf of small island states." Finally, NGOs often act as
watchdogs and thus monitor compliance with international
agreements.
12
International organizations, like the World Trade
Organization (WTO) or International Labor Organization (ILO),
have international legal standing based on international treaties,"
but NGOs do not have special legal status under international
law.14 "NGO's are created by private, natural, or legal persons
under national law and not, as in the case of international
organizations, through a legal act by States under international
law." 5 This has not prevented NGOs from making a difference in
the world scene, however, at international conferences,
organizations, and tribunals, and through linkage with like-minded
groups across borders.
B. States Are the Primary Actors
In spite of the increasing influence of NGOs, states are and
will continue to be the principal actors on the world stage, at least
for the foreseeable future. This has been true ever since the
8. See Martin A. Olz, Non-Governmental Organizations jn Regional Human Rights
Systems, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 307, 356-57 (1997); David J. Padilla, The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States: A Case
Study, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 95, 95 (1993).
9. See Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples
Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191, 198
(2000).
10. See id.
11. See id. at 198-99.
12. Karsten Nowrot, Symposium, Legal Consequences of Globalization: The Status of
Non-Governmental Organizations Under International Law, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 579, 580 (1999).
13. An international organization is "an association of States established by and
based upon a treaty, which pursues common aims and which has its own special organs to
fulfill particular functions within the organization." Rudolf L. Bindschedler, International
Organizations, General Aspects, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 1289, 1289 (1992).
14. Nowrot, supra note 12, at 622.
15. Id.
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Westphalian system was created in 1648, when states became the
supreme entities for domestic governance and international
relations."
In the context of international law, a state is "an entity having
exclusive jurisdiction with regard to its territory and personal
jurisdiction in view of its nationals."' 7 In the state-centric
international system, states guard their power closely. They do so
because international relations are marked by the struggle for
power. 8 This is an arena where states are constantly struggling for
an advantage in military, economic, or political power. States are
therefore reluctant to share power with non-state actors such as
international and national NGOs, since such acts would diminish
state power. Furthermore, devolution of power to legally
unaccountable entities would create a sense of anarchy in an
international order founded on balances of power and need for
stability.
It is in this environment that NGOs have sought to have
greater acceptance, influence, and access to international
institutions. NGOs would like a larger role on the international
stage to pursue their own interests in making policy and programs
to effect social, cultural, and political change. This desire places
the NGOs on a collision course with states, however, as states fear
an encroachment on their power and sovereignty.' 9
Nations will not agree to grant NGO representatives voting
rights at the UN. While NGOs may not have voting power in
international bodies, they strive nonetheless to influence
international institutions and conferences through lobbying,
serving on national delegations, and being involved in the drafting
process of international agreements, conference declarations, and
programs of action: Unfortunately for NGOs, however, states
dictate the rules of participation in international organizations like
the UN. NGOs believe these rules are too limiting and thus seek a
more expansive role.
16. See Jessica T. Matthews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50.50 (1997).
17. Karl Doehring, State, 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 600, 601 (1992).
18. HANS MORGENTHAU, POLITICS AMONG NATIONS 25 (4th ed., 1967).
19. Peter J. Spiro, The Democratic Accountability of Non-Governmental
Organizations: Accounting for NGOs, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 161, 166-67 (2002) [hereinafter
Spiro 1111
20. Id. at 166.
2003]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
C. NGOs and the United Nations Economic and Social Council
Under Chapter IX of the UN Charter, the UN seeks to
promote international economic and social cooperation.2' The
General Assembly of the UN is responsible for promoting such
cooperation through the Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC).2 The ECOSOC is empowered to set up commissions
concerning human rights and economic and social issues.
2
3
ECOSOC also manages and supervises NGO participation
within the UN system.24 The UN has officially recognized the
important status of NGOs and has codified the ECOSOC-NGO
relationship in the UN Charter. Article 71 of the UN Charter
states, "[t]he Economic and Social Council may make suitable
arrangements for consultation with non-governmental
organizations which are concerned with matters within its
competence. Such arrangements may be made with international
organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations
after consultation with the Member of the UN concerned."
25
Thus the only officially authorized manner an NGO may
participate in the UN is through ECOSOC. Furthermore, the
arrangement is one of "consultation" only and does not include
voting rights, delegation membership rights, etc26  NGO
contribution rights are thus severely limited within the UN system.
1. ECOSOC Rules Regarding NGOs
ECOSOC has enacted a number of rules regarding NGOs. In
1968, the Council passed Resolution 1296 (XLIV),- which was theS 21
first set of NGO governing regulations. In 1993, the Council
approved Resolution 1993/80 of 30 July 1993,29 in which it
requested "a general review of arrangements for consultation with
non-governmental organizations, with a view to updating, if
21. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
22. Id. art. 60.
23. Id. art. 68.
24. Ferdinand Trauttmansdorff, The Organs of the United Nation), in THE UNITED
NATIONS: LAW AND PRACrICE 40-41 (Franz Cede & Lilly Sucharipa-Behrmann, eds.,
2001) (1999).
25. U.N. CHARTER art. 71.
26. ki.
27. E.S.C. Res. 1296, U.N. EsCOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 1, E/Res./1296 (1968).
28. SUSANN KEPPLER-SCHLESINGER, THE UNITED NATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE
275, 277 (Franz Cede & Lilly Sucharipa-Behrmann eds., 2001).
29. E.S.C. Res. 1993/80, U.N. ESCOR, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/1993/80 (1993).
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necessary, Council resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May 1968. 30 In
1996, the Council adopted Resolution 1996/31, which set forth a
new set of rules that are currently in effect.
Resolution 1996/31 governs the admission of NGOs in a
consultative relationship with ECOSOC. ECOSOC's Committee
on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO Committee) has
jurisdiction over the application process. 2 An applicant seeking
consultative status first sends the requisite materials to the NGO
Section of ECOSOC's Department of Economic and Social
Affairs (DESA) for processing.'- The Committee meets twice a
year for this purpose.
NGOs seeking consultative status must support the "aims and
purposes" of the UN Charter. 5 Organizations that may seek
consultative status include "national, subregional, regional, or
international ' 36 NGOs. NGOs from developing countries are
particularly encouraged to become participants.
37
Resolution 1996/31 sets out specific eligibility criteria for
NGOs. First, a group must be "of recognized standing within the
particular field of competence." 3' A number of groups in the same
field may form a joint committee or body to make their views
known as a consultative member.' 9 Second, a group must "have an
established headquarters, with an executive officer."40 Third, the
NGO must have a "democratically adopted constitution. " ' Fourth,
the organization's representatives must have the authority to
speak on behalf of its members.42 Fifth, the NGO must be
30. E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, U.N. ESCOR, 49th mtg., Supp. No. 1, at 1, U.N. Doc.
E/1996/L.25 (1996) [hereinafter Resolution 1996/31].
31. Id.
32. See KEPPLER-SCHLESINGER,sUpra note 28, at 278.
33. Guidelines, Association Between the United Nations and Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs), at *6, http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo (Oct. 19, 2003)
[hereinafter Guidelines]. DESA not only screens NGO applications for consultative
status, but also supervises conference accreditation, reviews quadrennial NGO reports,
and provides NGOs with information. Id.
34. See KEPPLER-SCHLESINGER, supra note 28, at 277.
35. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 29, 2.
36. Id. 4.
37. Id. 6.
38. Id. 1 9.
39. Id.
40. Id. I 10.
41. Id.
42. Id.9 II.
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accountable to its members through voting rights or another
method of democratic accountability.
43
Furthermore, an approved NGO must be private in nature
and not a government creation.4  The DESA does not
independently verify actual compliance. Finally, an organization
must obtain most of its financial support from members or
national affiliates.4 Any government contributions must be
reported to ECOSOC.47 DESA does not independently verify the
information contained in audited financial statements submitted in
support of an application.
2. Consultative Arrangements Available to NGOs
There are three different types of consultative arrangements
available to NGOs: general, special, and Roster.4' General
consultative status affords the greatest bundle of rights.50 A group
is eligible for this category if it has "substantive and sustained
contributions to make" 5 in pursuit of UN objectives. Furthermore,
the group must be "closely involved with the economic and social
life" of its constituents, and have members "broadly representative
of major segments of society" in many countries and in "different
regions of the world.,
5 2
Examples of general consultative members are Oxfam
International, Socialist International, and the World Blind Union 3
General consultative groups are few in number compared to the
other two categories. As of November 1, 2002, there were 131
general consultative groups accredited by the UN.
43. Id. 1 12.
44. See id.
45. Voting rights and democratic accountability are determined by an examination of
an NGO's submitted constitution or by-laws. The UN does not actually verify this
requirement. Interview with Meena Sur, Program Officer, UN Department of Social &
Economic Affairs, NGO Section, in Washington D.C. (Apr. 11, 2003).
46. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 29, 9 13.
47. Id.
48. Interview with Meena Sur, supra note 45.
49. See Resolution 1996/31,supra note 29, 9$ 22-24.
50. See id. 91 22.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. U.N. Economic and Social Council, NGOs in Consultative Status with ECOSOC
(Nov. 1, 2002), at http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo/pdf/INF-List.pdf [hereinafter
NGO List].
54. Id.
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NGOs with special consultative status must "have a special
competence in, and are concerned specifically with, only a few of
the fields of activity covered by the Council."" The American Bar
Association, Nigerian Environmental Society, and the World
Jewish Congress are examples of NGOs with special consultative
status.56 The UN has given special consultative status to 1,197
organizations as of November 1, 2002. i Special consultative
organizations in the area of human rights should adhere to the
principles set forth in the UN Charter, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action .
The NGOs that do not qualify for the above two categories
are eligible for the "Roster" category. 59 Roster groups "make
occasional and useful contributions to the work of the Council or
its subsidiary bodies." 6' For example, the International Political
Science Association, Sierra Club, and the YWCA of Canada are
Roster groups. 6' There are 921 Roster NGOs.62
General and special consultative NGOs are able to consult
with ECOSOC's Council in a number of ways and thus have
greater power than Roster groups. They receive provisional
agendas from the Council and their representatives may sit as
observers at Council or subsidiary body meetings. They may
present written statements to the Secretary-General.63 Only
general consultative NGOs may propose their own agenda items,
however. 6 General consultative organizations may make oral
presentations to the Council, and special consultative groups are
eligible in limited situations.65
Roster NGOs, however, have more limited rights. They
receive provisional agendas, and may attend meetings within their
area of competence. They are also permitted to submit written
statements to the "Secretary-General in consultation with
55. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 29, 23.
56. NGO List, supra note 53.
57. See generally id.
58. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 29, 25.
59. Id. 9 24.
60. Id.
61. NGO List, supra note 53.
62. Id.
63. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 30, 9 27, 29-30.
64. Id. 9 28.
65. IM. 9 32(a).
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President of the Council or its Committee ,66 upon invitation by the
UN secretary general.
Resolution 1996/31 also sets forth rules concerning NGOs and
international conferences convened by the UN.6' These rules are
generally very liberal. NGOs of any ECOSOC status-Roster,
general, or special consultative-"shall as a rule be accredited for
participation ,61 if they express an interest in attending an
international conference. The operative word here is "shall." Thus
international conferences must accredit ECOSOC-approved
NGOs if they express an interest in attending.
An NGO that does not have ECOSOC authorization may still
apply to take part in a UN Conference. 69 Non-ECOSOC NGOs
must apply to the secretariat of the particular conference.0 The
application process includes a review of the purpose, programs,
and relevance of activities of the organization. Documents to be
included in the application include a copy of an NGO's
constitution, annual report, and financial statement.72 The
secretariat then submits the name of a prospective NGO applicant
to member states.73 Member states may comment on the
application, and the applicant is given the opportunity to
respond.74
Once the secretariat decides that the NGO is competent and
its activities are relevant to the conference preparatory committee
(PrepCom), the secretariat will recommend accrediting the NGO
to the PrepCoi.n 5 If the secretariat decides against accreditation, it
will provide the reasons why and permit the NGO applicant to
76respond or provide additional information. The PrepCom has the
final decision on whether to admit a non-ECOSOC NGO into a
conference.77
66. Id. I 31(f).
67. Id. 9 41.
68. Id. 1 42.
69. Id.
70. See id. 9 43.
71. Id. 9 44 (a)-(b).
72. Id.
73. Id. 9 46(d), (g).
74. Id.
75. Id. 47.
76. Id.
77. Id. 1 48.
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The admission of a non-ECOSOC approved NGO to a UN
conference is not guaranteed. Accreditation flexibility will vary
from conference to conference. Admission to the many different
UN conferences is guaranteed, however, if the NGO has a
consultative, special, or Roster status.
3. Privileges Enjoyed by the NGOs
NGOs have several privileges when they are admitted to a
conference. First, once accredited for a PrepCom session, an NGO
can attend all future PrepComs and the conference." Second,
accredited NGOs may briefly address PrepComs and the
conference at the discretion of the chairperson and the body.'
Finally, NGOs "may make written presentations during the
preparatory process," which may become official documents "in
accordance with UN rules of procedure." 0
The NGO Committee monitors the contributions and conduct
of consulting NGOs.8 ' The Committee holds a regular session at
least once a year, and may hold other sessions if needed 2
ECOSOC-approved NGOs must submit activity reports every four
years to the Committee to maintain general or special consultative
status. 3 These reports are the primary way the NGO Committee is
able to ensure that NGOs comply with membership requirements
and obligations. The NGO Committee is permitted to request a
further report from an NGO under exceptional circumstances.4
Roster groups do not have to file reports.
In practice, the reporting system is flawed. First, the oversight
framework is weak. Second, the Committee relies on information
78. Id. 49.
79. Id. T 51.
80. Id. 52.
81. Id. T9 51, 61(a). Current members of the nineteen-member Committee are the
United States, Cameroon, Chile, China, Columbia, Cote d'ivoire, Cuba, France, Germany,
India, Iran, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Russia, Senegal, Sudan, Turkey, and Zimbabwe.
The majority of members are from the developing world. Information sheet, UN
Economic and Social Council, NGO Committee, at http://www.un.org/esa/coordination/
ngo/committee.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Committee Members].
82. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 30, 9 61(b).
83. Id. T 61(c); Guidelines, supra note 33, at *6.
84. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 30, at 9 I.
85. Id.
20031
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provided by the individual NGO."6 Third, there is no independent
investigation to verify that an NGO adheres to the principles of
the UN Charter, if its constitution is democratic, or if its finances
are in order.s7 This lack of independent verification potentially
opens up the process to abuse, particularly in closed societies
where any kind of minimal follow-up is impossible and NGOs are
subject to government coercion or control.
Another problem is the Committee's workload. The
Committee has too many applications and reports to process and
not enough resources to adequately do the job, let alone verify
information."
Obtaining and keeping consultative status are not guaranteed.
It often depends on political factors. NGOs can have their
consultative status suspended or withdrawn by the Council, upon
recommendation of the Committee. 9 This occurs in situations of
improper activity by NGOs. NGOs can be punished for: (1)
"engaging in a pattern of acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the Charter of the UN including unsubstantiated or
politically motivated attacks' 90 against UN member states; (2)
receiving support from criminal activity (drug trade, illicit arms
trade, etc.); or (3) if the organization did not make a contribution
to the UN during the last three years.9' An organization can be
suspended or forced to withdraw if it does not continue to meet
the consultative status prerequisites.92 The Committee can also
recommend reclassification of an NGO based on report
information. 3
86. See Jurij Daniel Aston, The United Nations Committee on Non-governmental
Organizations: Guarding the Entrance to a Politically Divided House, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L.
943, 949 (2001).
87. See id. at 951-52, 961.
88. Id. at 961. During the NGO Committee's 2001 regular session, it reviewed 145
applications for consultative status, as well as 172 quadrennial reports. See Report of the
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations on its 2001 Regular Session, U.N.
ESCOR, Comm. on Non-Governmental Organizations, Substantive Sess. of 2001, at 1, 19,
U.N. Doc. E/2001/86 (2001), available at http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/
GEN/NOI/306/18/PDF/N0130618.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter NGO 2001 Regular
Session].
89. See Resolution 1996/3 1, supra note 30, T 58.
90. Id. 9 57(a).
91. Id. $ 57(a)-(c).
92. Id. 55.
93. Id. 91 61(c).
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D. The Politics of Consultative Status
Furthermore, politics plays a factor in whether an NGO can
be given or maintain consultative status. There are nineteen NGO
Committee members who represent nineteen different interests.
Western democracies, like the United States, France, and
Germany, are current members, but so are third world
dictatorships like Cuba, China, Iran, and Sudan.'4 Organizations
critical of certain Committee nations can expect a difficult time
achieving consultative status, or keeping it. 95
A recent example is the NGO Freedom House, a human
rights organization which promotes global democracy and civil
rights. It is known for its annual "Freedom in the World" survey.9"
This survey is frequently critical of the human rights records of
non-democratic regimes. An accredited NGO since 1995 with
special consultative status,97 Freedom House has had a number of
complaints registered against it by Committee-member states."
Moreover, Freedom House had to submit a special report to
the NGO Committee and address many questions posed by
different states on the scope and nature of its activities. 9 Cuba
expressed opposition for the group's alleged ties to the Central
Intelligence Agency and its general "subversive" nature.'00 Russia
maintained that its "activities were increasingly politically
motivated. """0 China also expressed reservations.
0 2
The Freedom House matter was deferred to a later meeting
for consideration. Every year, certain consultative-status NGOs,
often those dealing with human rights issues, are subject to
complaints by governments, usually non-democratic ones. Politics
can therefore be an unfortunate aspect of the review process.
94. Committee Members, supra note 81.
95. E.g., Cuba or Russia. See Aston, supra note 86, at 949-50.
96. See NGO 2001 Regular Session, supra note 88, at 32.
97. NGO List, supra note 53.
98. See, e.g., NGO 2001 Regular Session, supra note 88, at 26-35.
99. /d. at 26. The NGO Committee may request a special report from an NGO whose
consultative status is in jeopardy of suspension or withdrawal. Aston, supra note 86, at 949.
1O0. Id. at 26-28. The CIA links were denied by the United States. Id. at 32.
11. Id.at29.
102. See id. at 33-35.
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E. UN Conferences and NGO Forums
UN-sponsored international conferences are gatherings of
states, international organizations, and NGOs that hold meetings
and discussions on important world topics, such as global climate
change, the trade in illicit small arms and light weapons, or racism
and discrimination. The purpose of UN-sponsored international
conferences is to: (1) promote international awareness of
important issues; (2) achieve an international consensus in
formulating solutions; and (3) to interface with "civil society" to
achieve conference objectives.
03
A boilerplate conference occurs as follows. First, the process
begins with General Assembly or ECOSOC authorization of a
world conference.'04 A conference secretariat is formed to run the
conference and PrepComs and to accredit NGOs.0 5 Next, usually
several PrepComs are held, often divided by region or specialty
bases. PrepComs generate declarations and programs of action
that are forwarded to the actual conference.
0 6
NGOs hold their own parallel conference or forum around
the same time as the UN conference. 07 The NGO forum produces
two documents: a declaration and a program of action. " Next, the
NGO forum sends these documents to the UN conference, hoping
the elements of the documents will be adopted. 9 The conference
drafts a final declaration and program of action on a consensus
103. See Michael G. Schechter, U.N.-Sponsored World Conferences in the 1990s, in
UNITED NATIONS-SPONSORED WORLD CONFERENCES 3, 5 (Michael G. Schechter ed.,
2001).
104. See U.N. CHARTER, art. 62(4); THE CONSCIENCE OF THE WORLD app. A, at 282
(Peter Willets ed., 1996) [hereinafter CONSCIENCE OF T14E WORLD]; See also Third
Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination and the Covening of a World
Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, G.A.
Res. 52/111, U.N. GAOR 3d Comm., 52d Sess., 70th plen. meeting., Agenda Item 110, 91
28, U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/111 (1997) [hereinafter Resolution 52/111].
105. Resolution 1996131, supra note 30, 9 91 42-43.
106. See World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.189/12
(2002) [hereinafter Durban Declaration & Programme of Action].
107. CONSCIENCE OFTHE WORLD, supra note 104, at 51.
108. World Conference Against Racism NGO Forum, Declaration and Programme of
Action (Sept. 3, 2001), available at http://www.racisn.org.za/declaration.pdf [hereinafter
NGO Forum Declaration & Programme].
109. See NGOs Get Actively Involved in the World Conference, DURBAN 2001:
UNITED AGAINST RACISM (U.N. Off. High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., Geneva, Switz.), Dec.
2000, at 2, available at http://www.unhcr.ch/pdf/wcrnewsletterl.pdf.
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basis."' Finally, the General Assembly adopts the final conferenced . 111
documents. Implementation and follow-ups finish the process.1
2
A follow-up is an important facet of the conferences.
ECOSOC monitors implementation progress through its various
subsidiary organs to ensure that a conference program of action is
given effect. NGOs also assist in marshaling public awareness and
resources to fulfill implementation."' Since the program of action
is binding on states that approved it, individual nations fulfill their
action obligations.
11 4
III. UN WORLD CONFERENCE AGAINST RACISM 2001
A. Creation and Purpose
The UN held two world conferences on racism and racial
discrimination in 1978 and 1983, both in Geneva. The World
Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia
and Related Intolerance, held in Durban, South Africa, from
August 31-September 8, 2001, was a continuation of the WCAR's
predecessors.
The UN General Assembly (UNGA) adopted Resolution
52/111 on February 18, 1998. '16 This resolution authorized the
convening of a World Conference Against Racism, Racial
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, to be held
prior to 2001."7 The UNGA believed that another conference was
needed because little had been done worldwide to eradicate racism
and other forms of discrimination in the previous two decades.'
110. See Breakthrough in Durban, DURBAN 2001: UNITED AGAINST RACISM (U.N.
Off. High Comm'r for Hum. Rts., Geneva, Switz.), Oct. 2001, at 2, available at
http.//www.unhcr.ch/pdf/wcrnewsletter6_en.pdf.
11. Seeid. at3.
112. See G.A. Res. 56/266, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., 97th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 117,
U.N. Doc. A/Res/56/266 (2002) [hereinafter Resolution 56/2661.
113. Masumi Ono, From Consensus-Building to Implementation: The Follow-up to the
U.N. Global Conferences of the 1990s, in UNITED NATIONS-SPONSORED WORLD
CONFERENCES 169, 180 (Michael G. Schechter ed., 2001).
114. Ono, supra note 113, at 181.
115. See Memorandum on the Inter-Agency Task Force for Preparation for the World
Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance;
Transcript; Brief Article, 37 WKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 186,
186-87 (Jan. 22, 2001).
116. Resolution 52/11, supra note 114.
117. Id. at 5-6.
118. Id.at2.
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The goals of the Conference were to: (1) examine and
reappraise progress; (2) examine "ways and means" of
implementation; (3) increase awareness; (4) recommend changes
to increase UN program effectiveness; (5) discuss roots of the
problem; (6) develop action-oriented national, regional, and
international measures; and (7) make sure the UN has financial
resources to fight the problem." " The overall objective was to
formulate a practical plan of action to address the problem of
racism and other forms of discrimination. 20
B. Preparatory Committees
Several PrepComs preceded the Durban Conference. The
most important.were the three world PrepComs held in Geneva.
These committees determined the rules, organization, attendee
accreditation, and agenda of the Conference, and started the
drafting process for the Durban Declaration and Programme of
Action.
1. Geneva PrepCom I
The first WCAR World PrepCom was from May 1-5, 2000.
One hundred twenty-five nations and three observer states
attended; 12 eighty-eight NGOs participated.122 One of the main
tasks of the PrepCom was to formulate provisional rules of
procedure for the World Conference, from credential
requirements and the duties of the secretariat, to the rights of non-
state participants and observers.123 Rules 66 and 67 dealt
specifically with NGO participation. 24 Rule 66 permitted
accredited NGOs to "participate ... as observers in the
Conference... or working group on questions within the scope of
their activities."125  Furthermore, NGO representatives were
permitted to make oral statements upon invitation by the presiding
1t9. Id. at 5-6.
120. See id. at 6.
121. See Report of the Preparatory Committee on Its First Session, World Conference
Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, U.N.
GAOR Preparatory Comm., 1st Sess., at 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.l/2t (2000),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/racism/02-scndprep.html [hereinafter Report of
Prep. Com. 1st Session].
122. Id. at 5-6.
123. See id. at 14, 15.
124. 1i. at 40.
125. Id.
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officer and body.126 Rule 67 allowed NGOs to submit a written
statement within their area of competence as long as it pertained
to the work of the Conference and was on "a subject in which [the
NGO] has a special competence.' ' 27 These provisional rules were
later adopted by the Conference.'2
The First PrepCom decided the themes of the Conference,
which consisted of: (1) sources, causes, forms, and contemporary
manifestations of racism and discrimination; (2) victims of racism
and discrimination; (3) measures of prevention, education, and
protection; (4) effective remedies; and (5) "strategies to achieve
full and effective equality."129 The official Conference slogan was:
"United to Combat Racism: Equality, Justice, Dignity." 
30
2. Geneva PrepCom II
The Second World PrepCom took place about one year after
the first one. One hundred thirty-five nations and one observer
attended. 1 One hundred eighty-five NGOs participated. Ninety-
seven of the NGOs were organizations not in consultative status. 2
As a result of the Second PrepCom, three working groups
were established: a regional group composed of 2t countries
(Group of 21), a group tasked with drafting a declaration, and
another group assigned to drafting the program of action.
33
Moreover, the PrepCom addressed NGO issues. Six NGOs
sought PrepCom accreditation, but were opposed by states
pursuant to ECOSOC Res. 1996/31.134 After a roll-call vote, five of
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See Adoption of the Rules of Procedure, World Conference Against Racism,
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, U.N. GAOR Preparatory
Comm., 1st Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4. at 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/2 (2001),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/racism/01-events-cnt.html [hereinafter Adoption of
Rules of Procedure WC].
129. Report of Prep. Com. 1st Session, supra note 121, at 18.
130. Id. at 17.
131. Report of the Preparatory Committee on Its Second Session, World Conference
Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, U.N.
GAOR Preparatory Comm., 2d Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.2/30 (200t),
available at http://www.unhchr.chlhtml/racism/02-scndprep.html [hereinafter Report of
Prep. Corn. 2nd Session].
132. Id. at 4-6.
133. i. at 7-8.
134. Id. at 9. The six NGOs were: Asian Indigenous Peoples' Pact, People's Forum for
Human Rights and Development, Bhutan; Tamil Centre for Human Rights; Human
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the six were accredited.13' The PrepCom agreed to send states a list
of all NGOs seeking Conference accreditation for their review in
order for a final decision to be made at the last PrepCom.1
3
6
3. Geneva PrepCom III
The third and final World Preparatory Committee was held
from July 31-August 10, 2001 (shortly before the Durban
Conference began). Prior to the start of the session, Secretary of
State Colin Powell met with UNHCR Commissioner Mary
Robinson to express his concern about singling out Israel for
scrutiny and comment, and threatened to boycott the Conference
if this was done. Secretary Powell stated, the United States would
only accept language expressing "regret" for slavery and not a full
apology. Furthermore, U.S. officials feared that a Conference
boycott might be necessary as a matter of principle.
C. The NGO Forum
1. Purpose and Objectives
The NGO Forum began just before the Durban Conference.
The Forum took place on August 28-September 1, 2001. Nearly
18,000 people, along with 4,000 NGO representatives, descended
upon the coastal town of Durban for the Forum and Conference
activities. 117
NGOs attended the Forum and Conference in order to: (1)
publicize group agendas; (2) network and form links with similarly
minded groups; (3) lobby and influence state participants; and (4)
shape the content of the final Declaration and Programme of
Action. The main themes of the NGO Forum were (1)
colonization, (2) self-determination, (3) globalization, and (4)
institutionalization of racism.1
3
8
Rights in China; International Campaign for Tibet; and New Sudan Women Federation.
Id.
135. See id. at 9-14. Only the NGO Human Rights in China was rejected. Id. at 12.
136. Id. at 18.
137. Shambles and Fury in Durban, ECONOMIST, Sept. 8,2001, at 49.
138. Maria Miguel Sierra, The World Conference Against Racism and the Role of
European NGOs, 4 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 249, 255 (2002).
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2. Incidents of Anti-Semitism
Anti-Semitism was freely present at Forum events. Some
attendees distributed flyers stating "What if Hitler had won?" 3
Protesters shouted "Kill the Jews" and held signs stating "Hitler
should have finished the job" and "Zionism is racism." 
140
Furthermore, Israeli and Jewish NGO representatives were
harassed in registration lines by pro-Palestinian supporters. 4' The
infamous anti-Semitic Tsarist tract, The Protocols of the Elders of
Zion, was also sold at NGO booths.
42
The Arab Lawyers Union, an accredited NGO with special
consultative status since 1971,14 passed out publications containing
anti-Jewish cartoons depicting Jews with "hooked noses" and
"fangs."'4 Protesters disrupted an anti-Semitism seminar with
intimidating chants, and prevented a Jewish NGO member from
speaking. Only Jewish or Israeli accredited groups were singled
out for such horrible treatment.
In spite of such a chaotic environment, Forum organizers did
nothing to stop such anti-Semitic activity, even though some• • 146
NGOs denounced the inappropriate behavior. Ironically, an
international conference against racism was permitting overt
racism and intolerance to occur in its meeting halls.
3. Reparations and Slavery
The two other volatile topics emphasized by the NGO Forum
were reparations and slavery. Activists supporting reparations
issues numbered over two thousand. 4 Thus, such activists were
139. Michael Elliott, The Disgrace in Durban, TIME, Sept. 17, 2001, at 40.
140. Michael Salberg, In Durban Morass, Who Is to Blame?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2001,
at A18.
141. See Anne Bayefsky, The U.N. World Conference Against Racism: A Racist Anti-
Racism Conference, 96 AM. SOC'Y INTL L. PROC. 65,67 (2002).
142. See id.; Salberg, supra note 140, at 40.
143. NGO List, supra note 53.
144. Bayefsky, supra note 141; see also Tom Lantos, The Durban Debacle: An Insider's
View of the U.N. World Conference Against Racism, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 31, 46
(2002): Arch Puddington, The Wages of Durban, COMMENTARY, Nov. 2001, at 31.
145. See Bayefsky, supra note 141, at 67.
146. See Gay McDougall, The World Conference Against Racism: Through a Wider
Lens, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 135, 146 (2002). One U.S. delegate criticized human
rights organizations for not doing enough to protest the bad behavior of many NGO
participants. Lantos, supra note 144, at 50.
147. Jerry V. Leaphart, The World Conference Against Racism: What Was Really
Achieved, 26 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 153, 158 (2002).
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influential in shaping the NGO Forum's position on the issue of
reparations and demand for an apology for slavery.
D. NGO Forum Declaration and Programme of Action
After five days of speeches, press conferences, negotiations,
and drafting committees, the NGO Forum Declaration and
Programme of Action were produced on September 3, 2001.141
They consisted of consensus documents that were forwarded to the
Conference as civil society's contribution to be considered by the
state conferees. These documents addressed a number of
unrelated issues, ranging from the African slave trade to the Roma
(Gypsy) issue.149 Yet, controversy swirled around three main areas:
(1) the condemnation of Israel; (2) the African slave trade and
slavery; and (3) reparations for the descendants of slaves.' °
1. Israeli-Palestinian Issue
Israel was singled out for particularly vitriolic condemnation.
Israel was declared a' "racist, apartheid state,"'5' and was accused
of committing "racist crimes including war crimes, acts of genocide
and ethnic cleansing."'52 Israel was further condemned for the
"disproportionate numbers of children and women killed and
injured in military shooting and bombing attacks.' ' 53 Further, the
Declaration defined anti-Arab discrimination and "Islamophobia"
as forms of anti-Semitism. 1-4
On the matter of Israel, the Programme of Action
recommended a radical agenda. It called for an international force
to protect Palestinians, the establishment of a "war crimes"
tribunal, and a "UN Special Committee on Apartheid and Other
Racist Crimes Against Humanity perpetrated by the Israeli
148. NGO Forum Declaration & Programme, supra note 108.
149. See id. Other issues included were rights for disable persons, the girl child issue
(referring to young girls in developing countries who are exploited and marginalized
because of their status in society), migrants, HIV/AIDS, colonialism and foreign
occupation, as well as anti-Semitism. Id.
150. See id. 9 63-76, 98-99, 160-65.
151. Id. 1 162.
152. Id. 1 160.
153. Id. 164. The Declaration made no mention of the killing of Israeli civilians by
Palestinian suicide bombers. Only Israel was subjected to condemnation on the topic of
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. See id. 19 98-99, 160-65, 325, 417-25.
154. Id. $ 79.
[Vol. 26:217
NGOs at U.N.-Sponsored World Conferences
Apartheid regime." 155 It even called for the "reinstitution of UN
resolution 3379, determining the practices of Zionism as racist
practices. " 156
2. African Slave Trade & Reparation Issues
The other controversial area was the African Slave Trade
issue. Fourteen paragraphs of the 130-paragraph declaration
addressed the African slave trade, slavery, and reparations.17 The
transatlantic slave trade of Africans was declared a "crime against
humanity. '' '5 The NGO Declaration proclaimed that the slave-
owning countries must "recognize their obligation to provide these
victims just and equitable reparations" because "these nations...
owe their political ... and social domination" to the exploitation of
African slaves." 9
The structure of the Security Council was even found to
perpetuate "racism."'' 6' The UN was called to create an
international court to determine the amount of damages suffered
by the descendants of the African slave trade and slavery. 6' The
Forum demanded that nations benefiting from the slave trade,
such as the United States, form "an international compensatory
mechanism for victims," ' which included monetary compensation.
3. Other Demands
The Programme of Action ventured into other areas of
criticism. It criticized international economic institutions like the
World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and WTO, which were
found to "perpetuate economic and social injustices in the
developing nations." 1
63
The United States was another target of criticism. The
introductory language of the Declaration acknowledged U.S.
human rights violations of "the people of Vieques, Puerto Rico." 
64
155. Id. 9 9 417, 419, 421.
156. Id. 9 418.
157. Id. 9$ 63-76.
158. Id. 9 64.
159. Id. $ 71.
160. Id. 9 203.
161. Id. 231.
162. Id. 9 236.
163. Id.9 201.
164. Id. -9 33.
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The document demanded that the United States return "occupied
land to the people of Puerto Rico.,"165 The U.S. "blockade" of
Cuba was also censured as violating the human rights of the Cuban
people.'
61
Some NGO representatives made efforts to defeat blatantly
anti-Israeli references, but did not succeed. For example, many
internationally recognized human rights organizations, such as
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, "were asked to
vote against the anti-semetic language being proposed... [but]
[t]hey refused." 167
E. The Effect of the NGO Forum's Declaration and Programme of
Action
After receiving the NGO Declaration and Programme of
Action, High Commissioner Mary Robinson could not recommend
the document to the Conference because of the inappropriate
content."" The controversial language concerning Israel,
reparations, and apologies for slavery 
was unacceptable.A Ia
The Forum thus set the tone for the Conference. The NGOs
advocated one-sided international condemnation and action
against Israel. The global civil society backed a controversial plan
that demanded reparations and a legally binding apology from
Western states for slavery. NGOs that supported the radical
platform were encouraged, as some of the Forum's language found
a receptive audience among some state delegations. European
states and the United States grew concerned about what laid
ahead.170
1. The U.S.-Israeli Walkout
On September 3, 2001, the United States delegation walked
out of the Durban Conference. Commenting on the reason behind
this drastic event, Secretary of State Colin Powell stated that "you
do not combat racism by conferences that produce declarations
165. Id.
166. Id. 9 34.
167. Bayefsky, supra note 141, at 68.
168. Sierra, supra note 138, at 258.
169. See id.
170. See generally Lantos, supra note 144, at 40-44.
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containing hateful language." 7' The official Israeli delegation also
departed.
The reason for the walkouts was the anti-Israeli language in
the draft of Conference documents, which was indirectly
influenced by the Forum's Declaration and Programme of Action.
The Western European delegations chose to stay, yet they wanted
to quash any language in the final Conference Declaration or
Programme of Action that would open up legal liability for slave
reparations. 112
F. Durban Conference's Declaration and Programme of Action
The Conference's Declaration and Programme of Action was
more tame and less controversial than the Forum's version.' The
main substantive difference between the Forum and Conference
drafts concerned the treatment of the slave trade, slavery, and
reparations. Only the Durban Declaration acknowledged slavery
and the slave trade as crimes against humanity.7 4 The Programme
of Action, however, was silent on this point.
The Western European delegations were successful in
preventing inclusion of this language in the Programme of
Action. 15 They wanted to prevent the possibility of liability in
future reparations lawsuits from the descendants of former
slaves." " The Europeans were able to do this because the
Conference documents required a consensus for approval. Major
European powers would not have approved the Declaration and
Programme of Action otherwise. Although a formal, binding
apology was not accepted, "regret" for the slave trade, colonialism,
and apartheid was mentioned in the Declaration, and states that
had not yet expressed apologies were urged "to find appropriate
ways to do so." "'
171. Press Release, U.S. Sec'y of State, Colin L. Powell, World Conference Against
Racism (Sept. 3, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/4789pf.htm.
172. Puddington, supra note 144, at 32. A declaration that the slave trade was a crime
against humanity might lead to lawsuits from slave descendants seeking compensation
from former European colonial powers.
173. See Durban Declaration & Programme of Action, supra note 106.
174. See generally id. 1[ 13.
175. Elliott, supra note 139, at 40.
176. Id. Incidentally, this was also in the interests of the United States.
177. See Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 106, 191 99-10 1.
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On the matter of reparations, the Programme of Action urged
states to give adequate remedies, reparations, and compensation
to victims of racism and related intolerance "as provided by
national law." '78 A demand for reparations for descendants of
slaves was not included.
A second major difference was that the Conference's
Declaration and Programme of Action made no reference to Israel
as "a racist, apartheid state." This was a major improvement over
the Forum document. But the influence of Arab groups and pro-
Palestinian delegations was still apparent. For example, the Israeli-
Palestinian crisis was singled out for special mention-the only
international dispute referred to in the document.79 The
Declaration contained the language "[w]e are concerned about the
plight of the Palestinian people under foreign occupation."' This
phrase would have been unacceptable to the American delegation
had it stayed."'
Finally, the Programme of Action urged states to do more to
fight discrimination and racism through the enforcement of new
national laws, e.g., instituting affirmative action programs for
numerous victim groups, ratifying international instruments
regarding discrimination and intolerance, collecting data, and
increasing health, education, and other resources to victim
182groups.
The Programme of Action was a "wish list" of what should
be, rather than a realistic list of what could be accomplished. It was
short on substance, long on rhetoric.
G. Post-Mortem
The Durban Conference was a lost opportunity and a
disappointing and unproductive spectacle. Durban is an example
of disruptive NGOs pursuing unrealistic agendas antithetical to the
interests of important countries. The actions of many activist
NGOs did little to promote harmony and understanding in
relations between nations or to help tackle difficult problems.
178. Id. 165-66.
179. Id. 1 151. In addition, states were called upon "to counter anti-Semitism, anti-
Arabism and Islamophobia." Id. $ 150.
180. Id. at 1 63.
181. Lantos, supra note 144, at 48.
182. See Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, supra note 106, 1 13.
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Instead, they planted seeds of discord and displayed moral
hypocrisy.
Examples of impractical or unhelpful NGO activity at Durban
are many and can be summarized as follows. First, the actions of
some NGO delegates were improper. The distribution of anti-
Semitic literature, intimidation of Jewish delegates, and vocal
disruptions at some meetings by many Arab delegates and their
supporters were insensitive and inappropriate for an international
gathering under UN auspices. The UN authorities and South
African hosts should have done more to prevent the atmosphere
from descending into a moral and public relations fiasco. Security
personnel should have ejected disruptive attendees from meetings
and other forums. NGO adherence to basic principles of civility
should have been made a requirement for attendance.
Second, the NGO Forum documents were impractical and
unworkable. The narrow and various interests of activist NGOs
won out over realism. Furthermore, democratic Israel was
declared a racist and apartheid state. The result was flawed
documents that were meant to be civil society's contribution to the
Conference. All of these major elements of the NGO Declaration
and Programme of Action were rejected by the Conference. The
NGO contribution was thus more detrimental than helpful to the
state participants.
Third, the antics of the NGOs in the meeting rooms and the
unbalanced NGO document contributed to the walkout of the
world's most powerful country, the United States, from the
Conference. Israel was also forced to leave. The final Conference
Declaration and Programme of Action did not receive the
approval or valuable input of the United States, which could have
been quite beneficial for the Conference.
Fourth, it appears from accounts of the Durban Conference
that some accredited NGOs and delegate members did not adhere
to ECOSOC's "aims and purposes" clause under Resolution
1996/31, which states that NGO consultative groups must support
the principles of the UN Charter.8 3 The UN needs to do a better
job of ensuring that NGOs with ECOSOC status, such as the Arab
Lawyer's Union, which engaged in blatant anti-Semitic activity, 
4
183. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 29, 11 1-2, 57.
184. See Bayefsky, supra note 141, at 67; Lantos, supra note 141, at 46; Puddington,
supra note 141, at 31.
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are punished for not adhering to UN principles. These principles
certainly do not include intolerance for other races and religions.
In addition, the Council has the power to suspend or withdraw
consultative status from organizations which deviate from UN
principles.""
But the NGOs were not the only ones to blame for an
unproductive Conference; others were complicit as well. In
particular, Arab states like Egypt and Syria, and Muslim countries
like Pakistan and Iran, supported the PrepCom's harsh treatment
of Israel through the shaping of the Conference documents. These
states were complicit in doing little to shed light on the major role
of Arabs and Africans in the transatlantic slave trade.
The UN also aided and abetted the atmosphere of hate.
While Secretary Robinson did speak out and condemn the unfair
treatment of Israel, she did not exert her moral leadership to
prevent the focus on the Palestinian conflict at the exclusion of
many other conflicts where racism and discrimination are rampant,
such as the Sudan crisis. This lack of fundamental balance in
treatment of states and conflicts detracted from the legitimacy of
the Conference.
Those states seeking condemnation of Israel, or a radical
agenda to force Western countries to pay reparations, however,
could point to "international civil society's" Declaration and
Programme of Action to support their position. In this way, the
NGO Forum helped to give extremists the cover of acceptance and
legitimacy. Sympathetic states could only be emboldened to attack
the United States and Israel given the radical positions of the
NGO Forum.
In practical terms, the Conference and its resulting documents
were high on lofty rhetoric, low in realistic proposals. This was
contrary to the Conference's objective of agreement "on a strong
practical programme of action.., that will carry the fight against
racism forward."'86 The Conference proceedings did not live up to
its slogan of "United to Combat Racism: Equality, Justice,
185. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 29, 9 55-57. NGOs can be suspended or suffer
withdrawal if they engage "in a pattern of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of
the Charter." Id. The distribution of anti-Semitic literature might qualify under this
provision.
186. Press Release, United Nations (Aug. 27, 2001), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/
huricane/huricane.nsf/(Symbol)/RD.918En'?OpenDocument.
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Dignity.""" Secretary-General Annan's desire that the Conference
and Declaration "shine a spotlight into the dark corners where
racism lurks, in every society" never surfaced. " '
The UNGA ultimately adopted Resolution 56/266 on May 15,
2002.1", The General Assembly endorsed the Durban Declaration
and Programme of Action. It was satisfied with the outcome of the
Conference, "which constitutes a solid foundation for further
action and initiatives."' 9' No follow up conference was approved,
nor were deadlines given for implementing the Programme of
Action's recommendations.
In sum, the Durban debacle seriously harmed the UN's
reputation. 9' It lessened the likelihood of the United States and
the EU supporting a fourth WCAR in the future.
IV. Two CONFLICTING SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT GOVERNING NGOs
ACTIONS?
A. Acknowledging the Problem
Before a remedy to the problem of NGO excesses can be
fashioned, the literature on NGO participation in the international
arena must be examined. The main viewpoints on NGO
involvement can be distilled and divided into two competing
schools of thought, the "Accommodationist" and the
"Restrictionist" schools.
1. The Accommodationist School: Increase NGO Participation
As the name suggests, the adherents of the
Accommodationist school of thought want greater NGO
participation in the international system. They believe an
increased role would be beneficial. This school can be divided into
two main camps: (1) NGOs should have parity with states and
international institutions,92 and (2) NGOs should have some sort
of an increased international role short of parity.
187. NGO Forum Declaration & Programme, supra note 108,91 61.
188. Kofi Annan Press Release, supra note 7.
189. Resolutino 56/266, supra note 112.
190. Id. at 2.
191. Michael Banton, Lessons from the 2001 World Conference Against Racism, 28 J.
ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 355,360 (2002).
192. A related view is the creation of a Global Peoples Assembly (GPA), where
people throughout the world elect representatives to a world parliament without the
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a. The "Parity" Camp
Accommodationists holding the parity view believe that
NGOs deserve to be on an equal ground with states and inter-
governmental organizations and institutions because they are
important independent organizations representing civil society. 9'
Such Accommodationists believe that NGOs should be "co-
participants" in UN processes,14 and should have a seat at the
table at the UN General Assembly and other international
institutions.
Accommodationists believe NGOs should also have voting
rights on par with states. Therefore, NGOs, particularly those of
an international nature, can lay claim to this new stature because
they reflect and represent the global will of the people-a will
often ignored by national governments.
Parity advocates can point to parity in practice at the
International Labor Organization (ILO), where the triumvirate of
business, employee, and state representatives comprise national
delegations. At the ILO, business, employee, and state
representatives each have an equal vote. If parity works at the
ILO, then why not at the General Assembly?
The parity view is radical and politically impracticable.
Nations of the UN General Assembly, with only a single vote, are
unlikely to further dilute their power by sharing the Assembly with
NGOs or inter-governmental organizations. How could any work
get accomplished with potentially thousands of NGOs and states
voting and participating in the Assembly and its sub-divisions?
What criteria should be used to admit some NGOs and exclude
others? Who would decide? Solutions to these intractable
questions would be difficult. As mentioned before, states are
unlikely to permit such a dramatic increase in NGO power
anytime soon.
sanction of states or international organizations. It would co-exist with states and
international organizations. Arguably, because a GPA directly represents civil society, it
would have legitimacy and eventual international acceptance..See Falk & Strauss, supra
note 9, at 191-95.
193. See CHIANG PEI-HENG, NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS AT THE
UNITED NATIONS 231 (1981).
194. Id.
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b. The "Short-of-Parity" Camp
The "short-of-parity" camp offers a more realistic position.
For instance, Peter Spiro argues, NGO excesses can be lessened
through their inclusion in international institutions. This is
justifiable because the power of the state is in decline while the
power of NGOs has grown and continues to grow.195
Yet with power comes certain responsibilities, including
accountability.196 In democracies, the electorate holds state officials
accountable, and poor performance on the part of elected office-
holders can result in the office-holders' removal from office in the
next election. NGOs, on the other hand, do not have a comparable
mechanism of accountability. NGO members often do not elect
leaders, and few organization members follow on-going activities
with keen interest.9 As a result, NGO officialdom has a great deal
of flexibility in doing as it sees fit. NGO officials can renege on
bargains as if there are no consequences.198
Furthermore, if NGOs are kept out of the process of shaping
international agreements, NGOs and their members may consider
them illegitimate and repudiate them.9 " A lack of confidence by a
sizeable portion of the world community would cause difficulties in
agreement implementation, since NGOs are often an integral part
of this process. NGOs are not legally obligated to comply with
international accords; they are not constrained by the boundaries
of international law, unlike states.
To solve this dilemma and better utilize increasingly powerful
non-state actors which influence the international order, Spiro
proposes for NGOs to be more fully integrated into the system of
international decision-making. This can be accomplished by
195. See Peter J. Spiro, New Players on the International Stage, 2 HOFSTRA L. & POL'Y
SYMP. 19, 19, 28 (1997) [hereinafter Spiro 1I]; Stephan Hobe, Global Challenges to
Statehood: The hIcreasingly Important Role of Nongovernmental Organization, 5 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 191, 208 (1997).
196. Spiro III, supra note 19, at 167.
197. Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates: Nongovernmental Organizations and the
"Unregulated" Marketplace, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 957, 963 (1996) [hereinafter Spiro 1];
Nowrot, supra note t2, at 601.
198. Spiro I1I, supra note 19, at 162.
199. Spiro 11, supra note 195, at 33. For example, though permissible under
international law, Royal Dutch Shell chose not to sink the Brent Spar oil rig because of
opposition from Greenpeace and resulting consumer backlash. Shell now seeks advice
from Greenpeace on future rig disposal to avoid another backlash. Id. at 27, 33-34.
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granting NGOs some form of legal personality.2' Conferred rights
would include participation in international bodies and standing to
sue and file amici in international tribunals. 21" Obligations would
also be part of the deal, including adhering to bargains made.
202
Furthermore, NGO excesses might be further alleviated by
competition in the NGO marketplace for members and influence,
or even by states and corporations "buying off" NGOs. °3 Thus,
Spiro's co-optation plan would help accomplish greater NGO
inclusion, accountability, and transparency in NGO interactions
with the international system.
Another commentator, Karsten Nowrot, also argues in favor
of a new international framework of inclusion where NGOs would
be granted international legal status with commensurate rights and
duties.2 4 Only NGOs with "a positive attitude toward the values of
the international legal community"2 5 would be eligible for legal
status. Organizations that are violent or corrupt would be excluded
from consideration. Integration would permit better use of NGO
expertise, increase accountability, and further NGO legitimacy in
the world order.2 7
As an alternative to an NGO-inclusive framework, Nowrot
proposes a code of conduct. 2 8 While Nowrot does not sketch what
a proposed code of conduct would look like, she argues that such a
proposal would further the integration of NGOs as "derivative
subjects of international law."20 9 One concern is that states may use
a code to restrict participation of NGOs.
210
Spiro's co-optation and Nowrot's inclusion regimes are
interesting and provocative, especially the suggestion to grant
NGOs greater rights and legal personality. Even assuming that
state power is in decline, it is unlikely states would seek a further
reduction in their power by conferring more to NGOs. Even Spiro
concedes that the selection process by which NGOs would be
200. Spiro 1II, supra note 19, at 167.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 167-68.
203. Spiro 1, supra note 197, at 965.
204. Nowrot, supra note 12, at 614.
205. Id. at 596.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 596, 600-01,614.
208. Id. at 614.
209. Id. at 35.
210. Id. at 635-36.
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anointed with a bundle of significant rights would be
problematic.
21'
In addition, the NGO selection process is likely to be
controversial and political. Any "positive values" standard would
be subjective and meet fierce opposition from the many
authoritarian and totalitarian states participating in international
organizations. "Horse-trading" might even occur, where states
"A" and "B" would support the admission of each other's NGOs
on a reciprocal basis, regardless of the "positive values" or merit of
these NGOs. Developing countries would likely oppose the
imposition of "Western values" on them. Thus, any "positive
value" requirement would be watered down in light of opposition
from many states and result in the admission of some unsavory
groups.
Moreover, what will happen when NGOs break the law, as
did Greenpeace? Nowrot argues Greenpeace would still be
eligible because its objectives are "legitimate" and are "generally
oriented toward the rule of law. 212 But how is a "legitimate"
objective defined? What is meant by "generally oriented"? These
phrases are extremely subjective. Such unclear wording does little
to create a bright-line standard, which is necessary for the legal
integration of NGOs into an international order.
Further, if NGOs breached certain commitments, such as
those regarding the implementation of international agreements,
how would the breach be enforced? What penalty would result?
Would traditional contract law apply? What remedy could an
injured party be able to seek? Would such matters fall under the
jurisdiction of a national or international tribunal, or an
administrative body? Answers to these important questions are
difficult, and they would have to be sorted out for Spiro's regime
to work. These questions also point to the impracticality of Spiro's
co-optation and Nowrot's inclusion proposals.
Transparency and accountability might be accomplished
without co-optation. Misdeeds of NGOs, such as breaches of good
faith dealing, could be publicized via the Internet. Misbehaving
NGOs could also have their accreditation to international
institutions suspended or revoked, thereby crippling their ability to
advance their agendas in international forums. Although NGOs
211. See generally Spiro III, supra note 19, at 167.
212. Nowrot, supra note 12, at 618.
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may not be accountable to their membership, they could be held
accountable by states through restricted access to international
bodies.
Two aspects of the Spiro and Nowrot proposals which merit
further examination are the right of NGOs to file amici and the
development of a code of conduct governing NGO behavior. NGO
amici submissions would be fairly simple to implement. There are
many examples of national and international use of amici in
judicial proceedings and commissions. It would benefit decision-
makers of international bodies or conferences to have valuable
technical information in NGO amici. A code of conduct of sorts
already exists under ECOSOC rules, which is technically
enforceable!.
2 3
All in all, the Accommodationist school offers drastic
proposals based either on parity or greater inclusion in
international structures. Such proposals would probably worsen
rather than alleviate the myriad of problems that occurred at
Durban. Greater NGO influence may have convinced states to
pass even more radical Conference documents that more closely
mirrored the Forum documents. The Restrictionist school might
offer a more suitable approach to resolve the problem of NGO
excesses.
2. The Restrictionist School: Decrease NGO Participation
Contrary to adherents of the Accommodationist school, the
Restrictionist school maintains that NGOs are a problem for a
state-centric international system. NGOs should not be co-opted
into the international system and given greater responsibilities and
influence. Rather, NGOs should be constrained.
NGOs should be restricted for a number of reasons. First,
many NGOs pursue radical agendas. They want to advance
extreme agendas at the international level because their attempt to
lobby or enact their agendas failed at the national level.21 4 Liberal
environmental NGOs could never get domestic legislation passed
in the U.S. Congress like provisions of the international Kyoto
213. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 29, $ 55-59.
214. Kenneth Anderson, The Limits of Pragmatism in American Foreign Policy:
Unsolicited Advice to the Bush Administration on Relations with International
Nongovernmental Organizations, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 371, 373 (2001) [hereinafter Anderson
11]. Conservatives holding this view include Jeremy Rabkin, Jack Goldsmith, John Yoo,
and John Bolton.
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Protocol. Defeated at the national level, environmental NGOs
took their cause to the international arena, hoping for a more
favorable reception. The result was the Kyoto Protocol, which was
heavily shaped by environmental NGOs. The U.S. Senate never
ratified the international agreement, however, nor has it been
ratified by major European powers.- 5 The NGOs' effort thus
failed on practical terms at the national and international levels.
Second, NGOs are undemocratic. As stated previously, most
NGO leaders are not elected by their memberships. NGOs are
more like oligarchies than democracies. And because NGO
leaders are not elected, they are unaccountable to their
members.: 6 To leading NGO critic Kenneth Anderson, NGOs
reflect not the wishes of civil society, but those of governing NGO
elites:"'
Anderson has also written about NGOs' quest for
legitimacy." ' NGOs crave legitimacy from states and international
organizations. Democratic states derive their legitimacy from the
electorate, but un-elected NGOs lack an equivalent source of
legitimacy. The source of legitimacy often invoked by NGOs is
"international civil society. 21 9 Therefore, NGOs should be heard
and have a right to participate in international forums because
their "constituents" are global and not limited by borders.
International organizations, like the UN, propagate this view
because they too seek legitimacy via global civil society.220 The UN
also wants NGO support to "placate a group of well organized and
vocal critics." 21  Without the imprimatur of international
legitimacy, NGOs have limited authority and respect, and their
actions and motives may be subject to suspicion.
Third, NGOs are a threat to national sovereignty. There is a
fear among some scholars that if states cede power to extra-
national entities, including NGOs, it would diminish the sovereign
power of states to regulate their own affairs under their own laws
215. Id. at 387.
216. David B. Rivkin, Jr. & Lee A. Casey, The Rocky Shoals of International Law,
THE NAT'L INTEREST, Winter 2000/01, at 37. This can be contrasted with business
corporations. While most business elite are appointed, there exists a mechanism of
accountability in the form of shareholders and government regulations.
217. Anderson I, supra note 6, at 117-18.
218. See Anderson 1I, supra note 214, at 379, 380-81.
219. Anderson 1, supra note 217, at 117-18.
220. See generally Anderson 11, supra note 214, at 379-81.
221. Id. at 380.
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and constitutions. 22  The danger is that unelected, and therefore
unaccountable institutions and tribunals, would make decisions
that are not necessarily in the best interests of a nation-state. Such
interference violates a state's sovereignty, the right of a state to
govern those within its own territory.
While much has been written about the disease, few
commentators offer an adequate remedy. Anderson suggests that
the United States should reject NGOs as peers in treaty
negotiations, and cut off funding for NGO world conferences.
Commentator Frank Vibert recommends that international NGO
conferences "should be discouraged," that resources should be
directed to reasonable and effective NGOs, and that NGOs should
adhere to stricter standards of governance.224 But these suggestions
would not fundamentally alter a broken system.
3. Need for a New Framework
The Accommodationist and Restrictionist approaches have
pointed out some of the inherent problems with the NGO-
international system relationship. There has not been an effective
and comprehensive framework, however, to reform the NGO-
participation process in UN conferences. Such a reform framework
is desperately needed, particularly in light of debacles and
unproductive outcomes like the Durban Conference.
V. SOLVING THE PROBLEM BY LIMITING NGO PARTICIPATION: A
CRITIQUE OF SEVERAL REFORM PROPOSALS
There are a number of potential approaches to solving, or at
least alleviating, the problem of NGO excesses. A new NGO-
participation framework for UN-sponsored international
conferences might consist of the following reforms, each of which
will be examined and critiqued in turn: (1) institute an NGO
complaint system; (2) limit accreditation of groups; (3) have equal
viewpoint representation at conference meetings; (4) further limit
NGO access to conference proceedings; (5) prohibit NGO
representation on state delegations; (6) reduce government
222. Rivkin, supra note 207, at 38.
223. See Kenneth Anderson I1, supra note 214, at 386.
224. Frank Vibert, A Framework for Non-Governmental Organisations in International
Diplomacy, 2 CHI. J. INT'L L. 397,398 (2001).
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support of NGO forums and conferences; and (7) create an amicus
brief system.
A. Institute an NGO Complaint System
Under ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31, NGOs with
consultative status can get into trouble for not adhering to
requirements for consultative status or for "engaging in a pattern
of acts contrary to the purposes and principles" of the UN Charter,
including "unsubstantiated or politically motivated acts against
Member States." 225 But the process of dealing with problem NGOs
is fundamentally flawed. These NGOs are only brought to the
attention of ECOSOC on the basis of reports and other
information submitted to the Committee on NGOs.
26
States then can challenge the re-accreditation of errant
NGOs. The time frame for report submissions is four years for
general and special consultative status NGOs. It could take up to
four years for an offending NGO to come to the attention of
ECOSOC. In addition, Roster NGOs are not required to submit
such reports or information, and ECOSOC could remain
uninformed about such NGOs engaging in prohibited activity.
Thus, NGOs engaging in inappropriate behavior could continue to
participate in UN conferences for many years without being
subject to possible suspension or withdrawal of status.
Under current ECOSOC rules, there is no complaint
mechanism-other than the quadrennial committee review-that
would permit a member state, NGO, or other interested person to
complain about improper activities on the part of an ECOSOC-
approved NGO. Improper activities include disruptive behavior of
NGO representatives/attendees at conferences, engaging in acts
contrary to the UN Charter, and generally not adhering to UN
aims, purposes, and principles. Such activity would include
"unsubstantiated or politically motivated attacks against Member
States,22'7 as when many NGOs accused Israel of unfounded
crimes.
In light of this major omission in ECOSOC's oversight of UN-
participating NGOs, an independent complaint procedure should
be constructed. State and consultive-status NGO representatives
225. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 29, 1 55-57.
226. IM. 91 55.
227. Id. 9 57.
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should be permitted to submit complaints on improper NGO acts.
Limiting the submission of complaints to states and other NGOs
would prevent the submission of frivolous complaints from
gadflies or unrecognized groups, and reduce the workload of an
overworked ECOSOC. Complaints could be limited to a form, two
or three pages in length, containing basic information such as the
identity of the offending group, when the action(s) took place, and
a description of the alleged acts. A short form would help conserve
resources and promote efficiency.
The NGO section of DESA would receive the complaint as it
already screens NGO accreditation applications. An Investigations
Office (10) should be set up 228 to process complaints, investigate
them, and make recommendations to the NGO Committee on
what action, if any, to take. An investigation would probably
consist of interviews of complainants and witnesses and evidence
review. The 1O should utilize some sort of "reasonableness
standard" to vet unfounded or blatantly politically motivated
complaints. During a regular or special session, the NGO
Committee should then review the 10's investigation report and
determine if the offending NGO should be punished. The NGO
Committee would then refer its recommendation to the Council
for an ultimate determination. Punishment should be that
available under ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31-suspension or
withdrawal of status. This would cut down on the number of NGO
offenders at world conferences. Though the 10 would screen
unsubstantiated charges, an accused NGO would still have the
opportunity to respond to charges as currently available under
ECOSOC rules.229
A revision of ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31 might be
necessary to codify the complaint procedure and the creation of an
10, as well as to place complaint matters before the NGO
Committee's annual agenda. Though politics might intrude in the
NGO Committee's examination of a complaint, it is unlikely that
states would support egregious acts so as to prevent punishment.
Further, all states could make complaints against NGOs, but only
228. It would cost the U.N. more money to do this, but states of the European Union
and the United States would probably allocate additional funds for this purpose in order
to prevent future Durbans. See generally Maggie Farley, Durban Meeting Gets a Bitter
Review, Los ANGELES TIMES, Sept. 9, 2001, at A13.
229. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 29, $ 56.
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if complaints were founded in order to avoid state embarassment
on an international level.
A complaint system would be a substantial improvement over
the current system that does little to stop NGO abuses. The
complaint system would accomplish the following: (1) end
ECOSOC's impractical reliance on NGO self-reporting to find
abuses; (2) permit more timely notification of abuses; (3) punish
offenders on an annual basis instead of up to four years; (4) help
deter irresponsible behavior at future UN conferences once
examples were made by ECOSOC; (5) shine the light of publicity
on bad NGOs, thereby increasing transparency and self-regulation;
(6) allow responsible NGOs to flag bad actors that states might be
reluctant to flag for political reasons; (7) bring a mechanism of
accountability to NGOs that is essentially absent; and (8) bring
greater legitimacy to a much-criticized ECOSOC at a low cost.
B. Better Scrutinize NGOs Seeking Accreditation
ECOSOC needs to do a better job of screening NGOs
seeking accreditation and those wanting to maintain their
consultative status. ECOSOC should also take a closer look at
NGOs only seeking credentials for a specific world conference,
like WCAR. The primary reason is that activity by some
accredited NGOs does not comply with the "spirit, purposes and
principles" of the UN Charter.210 The UN purposes include
'promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex,
language, or religion. "' '
As mentioned earlier, the Arab Lawyers Union was one of
many NGOs that did not embrace UN purposes and principles at
the WCAR. Distribution of anti-Semitic publications 2 at the
Conference by an ostensibly professional attorney organization
does not advance the UN purpose of promoting respect for human
rights based on race and religion. The Arab Lawyers Union should
therefore be investigated for this incident at its next ECOSOC
review period to determine if a suspension or revocation of its
special consultative status is warranted.
230. See id. 2.
231. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3).
232. See Bayefsky, supra note 141, at 67.
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But situations like this can be prevented if a better NGO
vetting process was instituted. The current process is an honor-
based system, where an NGO provides information to ECOSOC
that it is in compliance with democratic voting procedures, has a
democratically adopted constitution, is not affiliated with a
government, and meets headquarters and officer requirements.
233
The DESA currently does not independently verify actual
compliance with democratic accountability and financial statement
requirements, however. This data would be difficult for DESA to
verify, particularly since NGOs seeking accreditation are located
in every part of the globe. At last count, there were 1,328
235international NGOs with general and special consultative status.
It would be impossible for ECOSOC's organs to conduct a
thorough screening of NGOs' actual compliance with the
threshold admission requirements. Investigation of NGOs would
also be difficult to do in closed societies like Iran, Libya, or Cuba.
The problem of verification also applies to NGOs seeking
only conference credentials. At the WCAR, 1,284 NGOs without
consultative status were accredited for the Conference and all
PrepComs. 236 They received approval from the Conference
secretariat pursuant to ECOSOC rules.237 The secretariat only
needed to examine an NGO's constitution, annual report, and
financial statement for approval.238 Unless the paperwork was not
in order, or there was opposition from a state(s), an NGO received
conference credentials. NGOs approved under this process
included the Association of Human Rights in Iraq (Iraq), the
Association of Islamic Women Jurists (Iran), the Black Radical
Congress (United States), and the Libyan Arab Committee for
Human Rights (Libya). Thus, the over 1,200 accredited NGOs
underwent merely a cursory examination that delved little into
whether they adhered to fundamental UN norms.
233. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 29, $ 9 9-12.
234. Interview with Meena Sur, supra note 45.
235. See NGOs Not in Consultative Status with the Economic and Social Council That
Have Been Accredited to the World Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination,
Xenophobia and Related Intolerance (as of July 30, 2001), at
http://193.194.138.t90/html/racism/05-ngolist.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2002) [hereinafter
Accredited NGO List].
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. Id. 1 44.
239. Accredited NGO List, supra note 235.
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The question arises: How can a better system of scrutiny be
constructed, especially focusing on verification of data submitted?
A thorough investigation by DESA, particularly an actual field
investigation, would be prohibitively expensive. It would make
little sense for an application reviewer to travel from New York to
Mali or Mongolia to ascertain whether a constitution was
democratically constituted.
A way out of this dilemma is to make applications by NGOs
seeking consultative status or conference accreditation subject to
public review or inspection and comment or both. In essence, the
international public would have a "right-to-know" option. Right-
to-know laws would promote transparency by providing citizens
with access to certain government information. The United States
has adopted a number of such laws at the local, state, and national
levels. An example is the Emergency Planning and Community
Right to Know Act (EPCRA), which gives the public access to
material safety data and toxic release inventories concerning the
environment.
Another example is an Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
financial reporting regulation, applicable to non-profit
organizations. Non-profits that seek federal tax-exempt status,
including those created for charitable or educational purposes,
must make applications and supporting documents available forpublic inspection. 24' These documents are made available for
public review at the IRS national office .242 Tax-exempt non-profits
must file annual financial returns with the IRS. 24' Returns must
also be made available for public scrutiny at a non-profit's
principal office and the national IRS office. 244 The IRS posts some
basic tax-exempt organization data on the Internet, such as an
organization's address, contact person, and custodian of records.
There is even a right-to-know law with international
dimensions. An environmental side agreement to the North
240. See Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 43 U.S.C.A. §§
11,001-23 (2002); Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing About the Public Right to Know: The
Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 11 J.
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217,218-20 (1996).
241. 26 U.S.C.A. § 501(c) (2002).
242. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6104(a)(1)(A) (2002).
243. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6033(b) (2002).
244. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6104(a)(3)(A) (2002).
245. 26 U.S.C. § 6104(a)(3)-(d)(l)(A)(iii) (2002).
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)-the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
(NAAEC)-gives citizens of Canada, Mexico, and the United
States public access to certain environmental information,
including "hazardous materials and activities in its
communities."2 46 Interested individuals or groups may also provide
submissions charging insufficient environmental enforcement of
state-parties to the secretariat of the North American Commission
on Environmental Cooperation (NACEC).2 47 This transnational
system of public access and comment is truly unique.
A new public-scrutiny system could be built by borrowing
from some of these national and international public transparency
regimes. An NGO application could be subject to public
inspection, just like the application of U.S. tax-exempt, non-profit
organizations. This could easily be taken a step further by having
DESA post an NGO application package on the Internet. This
would be more practical than requiring interested persons to travel
to Geneva or New York; after all, the thousands of small NGOs
from industrialized nations and the developing world simply could
not afford to do so. If the completed applications were also
available on the Internet, DESA bureaucrats would not be
bothered by constant requests for in-person inspections or copying
of documents for the public. Internet postings would thus be
economically efficient for both DESA and the public.
Once an NGO application is made available to "global civil
society" on the Internet, an NGO or citizen could initiate an
investigation of an NGO that may not be complying with
application requirements. If a concerned citizen or group
discovered evidence of an applicant's untruthfulness or past
wrongdoing, the individual or group could notify DESA through a
formal public-comment procedure. The public should have a right
to comment on applications for a nominal period of time, perhaps
thirty days after posting application materials on the Internet.
Comments provided to DESA would help to better determine the
eligibility of NGOs seeking consultative status or conference
accreditation.
246. See North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 14, 1993,
art. 10, 32 I.L.M. 1480 (hereinafter NAAEC.
247. Id. art. 14; see also Mark J. Spaulding, Transparency or Environmental Regulation
and Public Participation in the Resolution of International Environmental Disputes, 35
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1127, 1138 (1995).
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This new regime would have several advantages. First, it
would enable the UN to perform better screening without
spending more funds. Activist groups or states could notify DESA
of NGOs that are run or funded behind the scenes by states, do
not have members with voting rights, do not have a democratically
crafted constitution, or stray from fundamental UN norms. DESA
would still have to check into such allegations, but it would be
much cheaper than hiring additional UN workers to do the initial
investigation.
Second, by screening out potentially troublesome or
irresponsible NGOs, the UN would at least lessen the occurrence
of overt acts of racism, intolerance, and other morally outrageous
acts at PrepComs and conferences. The image and reputation of
the UN would not be tarnished if unruly groups were screened out
before participating in conferences like Durban.
Third, a public-scrutiny regime would shine the much-needed
light of transparency on NGOs that are often not accountable to
their members. The posting of constitutions, officer information,
and financial statements on the Internet would encourage people
to learn more about NGOs.
Fourth, screening out potentially problematic NGOs at the
application stage would reduce workload of NGO Committees.
Fewer NGOs would achieve consultative status given the stricter
review requirements. Fewer NGOs would thus be up for a
quadrennial review.
Fifth, better screening at the DESA level would lessen the
likelihood of politics intruding on latter reviews at the NGO
Committee level. A problem NGO might still avoid punishment if
a majority of the NGO Committee supported it. If such an NGO
were screened out at the beginning, this scenario would not occur
as often.
Finally, the new regime would lead to self-regulation among
NGOs. Groups that are undemocratic, that do not respect human
rights or fundamental freedoms, are controlled by authoritarian
regimes, or who receive financial backing from states, would be
less inclined to seek accreditation if their deviation from UN rules
and norms were exposed publicly. The new public-scrutiny regime
would complement the complaint system as a comprehensive
check on potential NGO excesses.
20031
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C. Balance Viewpoint Representation
A diversity of viewpoints among NGO groups would be a
substantial improvement over the current system, where one
ideological perspective typically dominates. For instance, at the
Small Arms and Light Weapons Conference (SALW), the
majority of groups sought greater domestic regulation of illicit
firearms. Only a tiny number of NGOs offered an opposing
viewpoint.
The NGOs present at the Durban Conference, were mostly
liberal or leftist. This was expected, as most victim-lobby groups
that seek more laws and benefits for their aggrieved members are
on the left. Liberal civil-rights activist Jesse Jackson was present,
as were representatives of major American left-leaning civil rights
organizations. 249 Any balancing of viewpoints was only evident by
Western delegates, who countered civil society's demands for an
apology for slavery, slave trade, and reparations. The scale tipped
greatly toward the Palestinian side on the issue of the Israeli-
Palestinian crisis. The voices of Jewish NGOs were drowned out
by the more numerous Arab NGOs and their many NGO
sympathizers.
To remedy this imbalance in viewpoints, ECOSOC should
institute new reforms to equalize NGO policy positions. One
suggestion is to divide the conference agenda into specific issue
areas. Plenary meetings and drafting committees should only
address particular issue areas. Issue areas should be broken down
into pro and con positions. For example, there would be a pro-
reparations view and an anti-reparations side.
To adequately present opposing sides of an issue, conference
organizers should encourage the formation of umbrella
organizations. An umbrella organization, encompassing many
different groups but advocating similar interests and goals, should
represent each conflicting side of a major issue. Rather than
having lopsided presentations on an issue, umbrella representation
would present both sides equally. Instead of twenty groups making
248. List of Non-Governmental Organizations Requesting Accreditation in
Accordance With Draft Rule 64, U.N. Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, at http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/ngolist.htm
(last visited Jan. 8, 2003). Only 10 of 177 NGOs seeking accreditation could be categorized
as pro-firearm. 1(.
249. Puddington, supra note 141, at 32.
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statements to a conference meeting in favor of, say, reparations,
and only one speaking in opposition to reparations, an umbrella
group would represent the twenty pro-reparations NGOs. The
presentation on reparations would in essence come from just two
groups, each representing a different perspective.
Though most groups would object to proxy representation,
the revised system would be more fair to NGOs that lack the clout
of more organized or influential ones. ECOSOC has recognized
this by authorizing the pooling together of groups "with similar
objectives, interests and basic views in a given field."'25 Further,
small NGOs with limited resources could get their message out by
joining with an umbrella organization. Therefore, more
mainstream and less radical perspectives would result. This is
because an informal consensus would be needed to speak out on
major issues on the agenda, as NGOs would have a limited amount
of time to present their positions to a committee or other body.
Extraneous matters of little import would waste precious time and
resources at an international conference that simply cannot cover
all matters of concern sufficiently. The majority view would
predominate within an umbrella group.
Umbrella groups have successfully presented their viewpoints
at past conferences. For instance, the International Action
Network on Small Arms (IANSA) represented 320 pro-control
NGOs from seventy countries at the UN SALW Conference .25 At
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
environmental NGOs banded together in a group called the
Climate Action Network to more effectively lobby and coordinate
the positions of its member NGOs. 252 Just as a nation-state
government represents the interests of their citizenry, so too would
an umbrella structure represent the interest of its citizenry-
individual, but like-minded NGOs.
In sum, viewpoints could be balanced on very controversial
and important issues by an umbrella system of representation. An
umbrella group would multiply forces and permit many small
250. See Resolution 1996/31, supra note 29, 9.
251. See Press Briefing, United Nations, Press Conference by International Action
Network on Small Arms (July 20, 2001), available at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/
docs/2001/lansaconf.doc.htm.
252. See Chiara Giorgetti, Front Rio to Kyoto: A Study of the hivolvement of Non-
Governmental Organizations in the Negotiations on Climate Change, 7 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
201,214, 238 (1999).
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groups with limited resources and budgets to participate. The
voice of an NGO that promotes 'an unpopular or minority position
on an issue, such as the NRA, could not be drowned out if
matched by one umbrella organization on the opposite side of the
issue, like IANSA.
D. Better Regulation of Access to Proceedings
The NGO presence at conference proceedings should
continue to be regulated to ensure that states have the upper hand
during conference negotiations, committee meetings, and other
forums. Accredited NGOs are only guaranteed that they can make
written statements to the Secretary-General and attend PrepComs
and conferences.'-" They can listen to the state delegates speak and
watch them conduct business, and perhaps submit a report; they
are guaranteed nothing more. NGOs may address PrepComs and
plenary conference meetings, but only at the discretion of the
chair.14 NGOs are specifically admonished that participation at
PrepComs and conferences does not "entail a negotiating role. ,,255
Arguably, tougher restrictions governing NGO access to
conference proceedings could be adopted. The reason for this
would be to prevent a Rio or Kyoto-like scenario where
environmental NGOs wield significant power in the hallways and
on the floor of plenary conference sessions.256 These environmental
NGOs also contributed in a major way to the drafting of
international environmental conventions by submitting their own
draft proposals to state delegations. 257 But NGO involvement at
UN-sponsored environmental conferences on climate change is a
special case. NGOs are conferred a broader official role by an
international multilateral treaty, the UN Framework Convention.
211on Climate Change. Successive COP conferences have tended to
expand the participation of NGOs 59
253. See Resolution 1996/31, supra note 29, $149-52.
254. Id.
255. Id. 1 50.
256. See Jo Elizabeth Butler & Aniket Ghai, The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change: Implementation and Compliance, in UNITED NATIONS-
SPONSORED WORLD CONFERENCES 123, 148 (Michael G. Schechter, ed., 2001).
257. Giorgetti, supra note 252, at 238.
258. See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework
Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, art. 7.6, 31 I.L.M. 848, 862 [hereinafter
U.N.FCCC].
259. See Butler & Ghai, supra note 256, at 148-49.
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Despite these concerns, the ECOSOC-participation
provisions are probably adequate to protect the primacy of state
actors at world conferences. NGOs should be able to observe
proceedings and provide written statements to plenary
conferences. A thoughtful chair should be able to limit NGO
addresses to plenary meetings in order to adhere to time
constraints and topic relevance. And, though not specifically
provided for under ECOSOC rules, a chair should be able to limit
the number of NGO representatives at conference meetings if the
numbers involved are too large and unmanageable. In such
situations, NGOs should be selected for participation through a
lottery to ensure fairness. Alternatively, NGOs left out could still
be "present" vicariously through the submission of amicus briefs
(this will be discussed infra). In sum, no reforms need be
implemented to limit NGO access in actual conference
proceedings.
E. Prohibit Representation on State Delegations
NGOs should be prohibited from serving on state delegations
at world conferences. The main reason is the risk of "capture" by
NGOs. Capture occurs when NGO representatives dominate a
state delegation so that its agenda essentially becomes that of the
NGO. For example, during climate change negotiations, the
Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL) not only
performed an advisory role for many small island countries but
also negotiated on behalf of some of them,26 ) doubtless because of
its expertise in environmental law. Capture also was a problem
during the Ottawa Convention negotiations, where "some
countries essentially handed their policy and negotiating apparatus
to activists. 261
Capture is problematic because NGOs have very different
agendas than states. NGOs are single issue-oriented, while states
have to take many diverse viewpoints and the national interest
into consideration. States, particularly democratic ones, need to
260. Falk & Strauss, supra note 9, at 198-99; see also Jessica T. Matthews, Power Shift,
FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 1997, at 50, 55. Delegate capture might be all right if the
interests of a nation are closely aligned with those of NGOs, like the case of the small-
island nation of Vanuatu on the issue of global warming, but delegate capture would be
impractical for a superpower like the United States with diverse interests and
constituencies.
261. See Anderson 1, supra note 6, at 112.
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look closely at public opinion from many sectors of society. NGOs,
however, need only worry about pleasing their narrow
constituencies who are at least implicitly unified behind their
leaders. If, for instance, environmental NGOs capture a
delegation, the views of business NGOs or other citizens with
differing interests would receive short shrift. This would be unfair.
Further, a state might need to incrementally implement a course of
action because of political or other reasons. An NGO might
consider incremental change too slow or insufficiently
comprehensive, and instead advocate radical and immediate
change .262
Carried to its extreme, a number of significant NGO-
dominated delegations could craft a program of action or
agreement that is too radical for major states like the United
States to accept. It would waste UN conference resources if
quixotic agreements lacking universality were the norm.
Opponents of the UN would be justified in denouncing the
international organization and in seeking more cuts in the UN
budget or a reallocation of resources.
A ban on delegations would require an amendment to Part
VII of ECOSOC Resolution 1996/31. Paragraph 50 reads "[i]n
recognition of the intergovernmental nature of the conference and
its preparatory process, active participation of non-governmental
organizations therein, while welcome, does not entail a negotiating
role.'2 63 The paragraph should be revised to state "active
participation of non-governmental organizations on Member State
delegations is prohibited, and non-governmental organizations
may not participate in a negotiating role." This would install a
barrier between states and NGOs, but it would be necessary to
prevent the likelihood of capture and its adverse effects, it would
also ensure the primacy of states in a state-centric world. NGOs
would still be able to lobby states and provide them with
information. They would only be proscribed from participating in
direct delegation and states' closed door meetings.
262. This was the position of the umbrella NGO coalition, the International Campaign
to Ban Landmines (ICBL), during the Ottawa Convention discussions. The ICBL had a
take it or leave it approach-ban all mines now, with no exceptions. This agenda was too
far-reaching for the United States, which rejected the convention. See id. at 106.
263. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 29, 50.
[Vol. 26:217
NGOs at U.N.-Sponsored World Conferences
F. Limit Financial Contributions
The power of the purse should not be underestimated as an
element of influence in the NGO-participation process. UN
international conferences are expensive affairs. It takes a lot of
money to fund travel, meal, and meeting hall expenses of UN
technical staff, interpreters, translators, and other personnel
associated with the several regional PrepComs and the actual
conference. NGOs also have to provide the bill for travel, food,
and room costs to attend the Forum and the final Conference
events. The host country usually provides most of the funds for the
physical facilities for the conference, as well as security. But the
UN still has many expenses to pay. The UN's budgeted cost for the
WCAR in Durban was $11 million. 4 The United States even
donated an additional $250,000 to the Conference.
This generous subsidy of world conferences by the United
States and other nations should end. If fewer funds were available
to world conferences and NGO forums, the participation of
massive numbers of NGOs would correspondingly be reduced.
This is because less money will buy fewer hotel-meeting rooms,
conference halls, etc. Less funding would prevent world
conferences from becoming huge, uncontrollable events where
boisterous masses dominate forum agenda and intimidate those
with contrary opinions. Budget constraints would also force fiscal
discipline on conference organizers. UN organizers would be
inclined to utilize more economical methods of NGO participation
through the use of umbrella groups or amicus briefs. A conference
host country might still continue to subsidize a world conference
because the many attendees would give a boost to the local
economy, but pressure from the United States and/or the EU
might convince a host state to cut back on extravagant support.
264. Banton, supra note 191. at 360.
265. A Discussion on the U.N. World Conference Against Racism: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights of the House Committee on
Int'l Relations, 107th Cong. 28 (2001) (prepared statement of William B. Wood, Acting
Asst. Sec'y of State for Int'l Org. Aff.).
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G. Create An Amicus System
1. Definition and Benefits
An amicus curiae, Latin for "friend of the court,, 26 is defined
as a "person who is not a party to a lawsuit but who petitions the
court or is requested by the court to file a brief in the action
because that person has a strong interest in the subject matter.267 A
legal feature developed during Roman times,26 ' amicus briefs have
become a prominent and useful aspect of American jurisprudence
in both the federal and state-court systems. Benefits of amici
include: (1) providing tribunals with expert information that may
not have been provided by parties to a chse; (2) promoting judicial
economy because research and analysis on specific issues have
already been done for fact finders; and (3) reducing the need for
expensive and time-consuming in-court testimony by experts.
2. Amici in the United States Federal Court System
The United States Supreme Court has long-standing amicus
rules. It welcomes amicus filings on matters that have not already
been brought to the attention of the Court.2 9 Submissions are 'not
favored" if the subject matter is not new. 2 ' Third parties seeking to
file amici in a case for oral argument must receive written consent
from all interested parties, or seek leave of the Court through a
noticed motion. 27 No motion for leave to file an amicus brief is
required of counsel for government entities, such as the federal
government, states, cities, counties, etc. 272 The Court limits briefs
273to thirty pages.
United States Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP)
Rule 29 provides requirements for filing amicus briefs in federal
appeals court cases. Like the U.S. Supreme Court, government
entities may file amici "without the consent of the parties or leave
266. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 83 (7th ed. 1999).
267. Id.
268. Michael J. Harris, Note, Amicus Curiae: Friend or Foe? The Limits of Friendship
in American Jurisprudence, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1, 3 (2000).
269. SuP. CT. R. 37(1).
270. Id.
271. Id. 37(1)-37(3).
272. Id. 37(4).
273. Id. 33(l)(g)(xii).
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of the court. 2 14 Nonparties may file amici only by leave of the
court or consent of the parties. Leave of the court requires a
motion including: (1) the movant's interest, and (2) rationale as to
why the amicus brief is "desirable" and relevant: Finally, the
submitted brief must comply with document filing standards. 7
Thus, the rules for amicus brief filings in the federal court
system can be boiled down to two main requirements: (1) consent
of all parties or leave of court is required, and (2) the brief must
not only be relevant but address matters not previously addressed
to the court.
3. Anmicus Briefs in Other Systems
Three international institutions permitting amicus filings are
the WTO, European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), and the
Inter-American Court. Each system will be examined for possible
adaptation to UN conferences.
The WTO was created in 1994 at the Uruguay Round talks as
an institution to promote free trade, tear down trade barriers, and
assist in settling trade disputes between nations: A pane can
review a trade dispute between nations for resolution. 279 The
appellate body can hear an appeal after a panel decision, and its
ruling is final.
NGOs have been unable to participate in WTO proceedings,
unlike their considerable participation in UN bodies.2 8' But in
1998, the appellate body held that a panel may consider at its
discretion unsolicited amicus submissions. 2 A flood of un-
274. FED. R. APP. P. 29 (a).
275. Id. 29(a)-(b).
276. Id. 29(b).
277. Id. 29(c).
278. GRAHAM DUNKLEY, THE FREE TRADE ADVENTURE: THE WTO, THE
URUGUAY ROUND AND GLOBALISM - A CRITIQUE 3 (2d ed., Melbourne University
Press 2000) (1997).
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Steve Charnovitz, Opening the WTO to Nongovernmental Interests, 24 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 173, 173-74 (2000).
282. WTO Appellate Body Report on United States - Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS581AB/R, 28-29 (Oct. 12, 1998), available at
http://www.wto.org/englishltratop--,e/dispu-e/distabase_wtomembers3_e.htm. The
appellate body's ruling was based on Article 13.1 of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding (DSU), which states that a panel "shall have the right to seek information
and technical advice from any individual or body which it deems appropriate." Id.
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requested amicus briefs need not occur, as a dispute panel does
not have to accept all submissions.283
The Appellate Body has not yet reached a comprehensive
rule governing amicus briefs, as this issue has been very
controversial with nations other than the United States.2 4 In the
E.C.-Asbestos case,285 the Appellate Body created some minor
requirements for unsolicited amicus submissions by non-parties. 2 6
The requirements included: (1) non-parties must apply for leave to
file, and (2) non-parties must answer questions relating to
relevance of the brief and background information about the non-
parties.287 These requirements were only applicable to the E.C.-
Asbestos matter and where not meant to be a conclusive Appellate
Body opinion on amicus briefs generally. 28 The WTO-amicus
submission framework is thus in the development stages. This ad
hoc system would be a poor model for UN Conferences because
the conferences need a definitive structure.
In 1994, Protocol No. 11 of the European Convention merged
the European Human Rights Commission with the European
Court of Human Rights.2 9 ECHR's jurisdiction covers individual
and inter-state human rights complaints. 29 NGOs may bring cases
before the court.21 NGOs may also submit amici.
9 2
The Inter-American Court was formed in 1979. Its purpose is
to adjudicate matters involving the application and
interpretation" of the American Convention on Human Rights.293
This court has one of the most developed arnicus brief systems of
international courts. Unlike the tribunals previously discussed,
this court is unique in its broad acceptance of amici in both
283. Padideh Ala'i, Judicial Lobbying at the WTO: The Debate Over the Use of Anicus
Curiae Briefs and the U.S. Experience, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 62,62, 73, 83-84 (2000).
284. Charnovitz, supra note 281, at 188.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Ala'l, supra note 283, at 80.
289. Oz, supra note 8, at 348-49.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Ud.
293. Thomas Buergenthal, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUB. INT'L L. 1008, 1008 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 1992).
294. Oz, supra note 8, at 359.
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advisory and contentious cases before the court. 95 The Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of
American States screens human rights cases brought before the
court.2"' Though private parties may not litigate contentious cases
before the court, private party attorneys-including NGO
attorneys-can do so acting as legal advisers to the Commission. 29 1
Human rights NGOs may also offer amici for the court's review.
NGOs and other actors are encouraged to submit briefs, and they
have "provided invaluable contributions to the court's
deliberations and judgments. ,299
4. New Amicus System
A fledgling amicus system already exists within ECOSOC and
the conference system. ECOSOC rules already allow NGOs to
make written statements to the Council and to conference
PrepComs.3) A Durban NGO may even submit a written
statement to the Conference as long as it was Conference related
and within an NGO's area of competence. 0 ' Many NGOs took
advantage of this provision. But while the foundation exists for
arnicus-brief submissions, it is too amorphous to be effective and
efficient.
Adopting a new amicus system might help alleviate the more
radical excesses of NGO conference participation. This model
should consist of elements borrowed from the U.S. federal court
and W'TO panel amicus brief systems.
295. Dinah Shelton, The Participation of Nongovernmental Organizations in
International Judicial Proceedings, 88 AM. J. INT'L L. 611, 638 (1994). The Court can "hear
as a witness, expert witness, or in any other capacity, any person whose evidence,
statement or opinion it deems to be relevant." Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights in Affect as of January 1, 1997, art. 44(1) (1997), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/rulel-97.htm [hereinafter Rules of Procedure of
Inter-American Court].
296. Padilla, supra note 8, at 108.
297. Id.
298. Shelton, supra note 295, at 638.
299. Padilla, supra note 8, H 1; Shclton, supra note 295, at 638. The Court can "hear as
a witness, expert witness, or in any other capacity, any person whose evidence, statement
or opinion it deems to be relevant." Rules of Procedure of Inter-American Court, supra
note 295, art. 44(1).
300. Resolution 1996/3 1. supra note 29, 99 30, 52.
301. Report of the Preparatory Committee on Its First Session, World Conference
Against Racism. Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, U.N.
GAOR Preparatory Comm., 1st Sess., at 40, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/PC.1/21 (2000),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/racism/02-scndprep.html.
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An NGO that believes it has significant information to be
communicated to Conference officials could do so in the form of
an amicus brief. The brief would be submitted to a new
Conference organ, the amicus-brief selection subcommittee
(Selection Subcommittee). Two or three submission periods would
take place before the PrepComs and Conference. Briefs submitted
for review would consist of three basic elements: (1) the NGO's
interest in proposing the brief, (2) a statement of the NGO's
competence in its asserted area of expertise, and (3) the relevance
of the NGO's submission to the subject matter before the
Subcommittee. The Selection Subcommittee would take all three
elements into account.
Regarding the first element, an NGO would have to set forth
why it is interested in making an amicus contribution. Is it because
it has something meaningful to offer because of a long-term
involvement with an issue under consideration by the PrepCom or
conference? Or is it for other reasons?
The second factor, competence, is very important.
Competence means that only NGOs with specific expertise on a
subject matter should be able to submit a brief. ECOSOC already
recognizes this notion in the criteria it uses to establish various
levels of NGO consultative status. An NGO devoted to
environmental issues would have little competence and expertise
to offer on a topic like slavery in Mauritania and Sudan. If an
NGO is not competent to provide advice on a topic of concern to a
conference, it would waste a PrepCom or conference's precious
time to read and study an amicus submission that is not the
product of thoughtful factual research and analysis reflective of
expertise.
The last factor, relevance of a brief, is whether the brief
relates to or has "pertinence to the issue at hand.""' For instance,
a brief on the topic of fluid mechanics would simply not relate to
racism, discrimination, or other forms of intolerance. A brief on
the persecution of the Dalits in South Asia would be relevant.
Amicus briefs would be subject to specific format
requirements. Page limitations would be necessary; perhaps a limit
of ten pages. If no page restriction existed, lengthy NGO
submissions would overwhelm the Selection Subcommittee that
302. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 29, 9 22-24.
303. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1293 (7th ed. 1999).
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has limited time to review many submissions. NGOs would have to
focus on major aspects of an issue in light of the page limitation.
This would not be a problem overall, as hundreds of submissions
would cover major conference issues adequately.
The question arises: How would members of the Selection
Sub-committee be chosen? Would they consist of the committee as
a whole, the secretary, or a just a few members of the committee?
This is a very important question because views of NGOs may be
unjustly excluded because of political considerations. For instance,
an Iranian committee delegate would not vote for consideration of
an amicus brief from a human rights NGO exposing Iranian
intolerance and persecution of national minorities within its
borders. To remedy this situation, a national delegate should not
have veto power over an NGO submission. Perhaps the Selection
Subcommittee should be composed of three members, the
Conference secretary and two state delegates, one from the North
and the other from the South, as a practical and acceptable
compromise.3  The secretary, who should be unbiased by virtue of
his or her prominent position, would have an appropriate tie-
breaking vote should it go down along North-South lines. The
Selection Subcommittee's non-acceptance of a brief would be final
and not be subject to appeal. Otherwise, it would be too time-
consuming and costly in light of potentially hundreds of NGO
submissions.
In addition, NGOs should have to choose between giving
actual oral presentations and written amicus submissions in
Conference proceedings. This would prevent wasting a
committee's time with duplicative information, and prevent NGOs
from having "two bites at the apple."
There are many advantages of an arnicus system of input. Just
as in other tribunals or commissions, amici would provide
decision-makers with condensed, expert information at a low
cost-without a need for actual testimony by conference
attendees-thereby promoting economy of resources. The system
304. This is probably the least controversial classification. A "democratic" and "non-
democratic" government division would unleash a great deal of controversy over what is
meant by democratic, with non-democratic countries not wishing to support such a
"subjective" classification. A North-South or developing-developed country division
would be least subject to controversy and would likely be an acceptable compromise to
most states. In addition, at least one democracy will be present among the two voting
states.
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would also permit small NGOs, particularly those for which
conference participation abroad would be prohibitively expensive,
to participate in a conference in a meaningful way without
incurring large expenses in the process. Another advantage is that
it would reduce the rowdy atmosphere that often pervades large
international conferences. The presence of boisterous NGO
representatives and their supporters would be unnecessary if NGO
input was done through amici.
The ECOSOC rules need only be slightly amended to
incorporate a new amicus system of NGO participation.
Accredited NGOs already may make written contributions to
PrepComs,"' and conferences can adopt their own rules in this
regard. A rule outlining the composition and responsibilities of the
Selection Subcommittee would have to be approved by ECOSOC.
The change, however, would be relatively minor.
H. Summary
The reforms sketched out above would be major
improvements over the current flawed system regulating NGO
involvement at UN global conferences. NGOs would make useful
contributions while maintaining the primacy of state actors. NGO
transparency and accountability would also be promoted through
the creation of tougher accreditation standards and a complaint
system. Viewpoint balance and the use of amicus briefs would
ensure that all voices in a discussion are adequately represented.
Finally, the new reforms would cost very little, and much of the
vetting would be done through self-regulation and citizen
watchdog groups.
VI. CASE STUDY APPLYING THE SOLUTION: WCAR 20XX
How would the suggested reforms work at an actual
conference? The reform approaches developed above will be
examined in the context of a future World Conference Against
Racism. This will require the acceptance of a few assumptions for
purposes of illustration. Some measured speculation will also be
unavoidable.
In this section, the reforms will be applied to the five major
segments of a hypothetical WCAR 20XX: NGO accreditation,
305. Resolution 1996/31, supra note 29, 52.
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PrepComs, the Forum, Conference, and follow-up. Some
hypothetical, but likely, situations involving NGOs under the new
reform regime will be analyzed and conclusions drawn.
A. Applying a Better Screening Program
Consider the case of NGO "X." It is a long-standing Arab
human rights group with headquarters in Cairo, Egypt. Its
organizational mission is to advance human rights and the just
treatment of Arab peoples throughout the world. It is highly
supportive of the Palestinian people in their struggle against Israel.
NGO X wants to participate in WCAR 20XX in a substantial
way, and seeks general or special consultative status with
ECOSOC. In the alternative, it will accept only accreditation for
the upcoming conference. NGO X submits an application to
DESA for consideration. NGO X's constitution, officer
information, and financial data are posted on the Internet for
public review. Public comments are accepted for a period of thirty
days from interested citizens, states, and groups.
A number of individuals examine NGO X's materials on the
website. After interviewing some disgruntled former members, a
watchdog group discovers that NGO X does not permit its
members to vote democratically on the election of board
members. Further, NGO X receives funding from Arab
governments, including Syria, Egypt, and the Palestinian
Authority-funds that were not reported on its ECOSOC
application. The Israeli government also confirms these
discrepancies and provides the watchdog group with
documentation to this effect.
The watchdog group's Internet research also reveals
statements by NGO X's chairman, official editorial articles, and
publications of NGO X that advocate the destruction of the Jewish
people and terrorist attacks against Israel and the United States.
The watchdog group, the state of Israel, and individual activists
separately file comments with DESA opposing NGO X's
acceptance on the basis of its undemocratic nature, state
sponsorship, and views that are contrary to the purposes and
principles of the UN.
DESA has done an investigation based primarily on
information submitted as part of the public-comment process, and
it verifies the discrepancies pointed out by the watchdog group and
others. DESA is now handed a political "hot potato." If it rejects
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NGO X's application, a number of Arab states would be offended,
charging discrimination. But DESA and ECOSOC's credibility
would suffer if NGO X did not follow the eligibility rules but was
still accepted. The likely end result of NGO X's application:
rejection.
Under the old system, DESA would have accepted NGO X's
word that it has democratic voting rights and receives financial
backing from only private sources. DESA would probably not
have delved into NGO X's statements and positions showing a
lack of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.
NGO X would have achieved special consultative status, with the
only check-and-balance being a politically driven NGO Committee
quadrennial review process. The NGO Committee would likely
renew NGO X's consultative status because the developing states,
and perhaps Chinese and Russian committee members, would
support an Arab NGO out of political considerations.
Even though it was rejected for consultative status, NGO X
could still seek conference accreditation. NGO X would have to
file similar documentation with the Conference Secretariat, which
would be posted on the Internet. Public commentary would reveal
problems with the NGO's commitment to UN norms and the
relevance of its activities to fighting discrimination and
intolerance. States, such as Israel and the United States, would
also be able to comment on the application. NGO X would have
the opportunity to respond, as it would in the consultative status
application. Faced with overwhelming evidence of non-compliance
with ECOSOC standards, and to ensure the credibility of the UN,
it is likely that an initial conference PrepCom would also reject
NGO X's application. Confronted with this prospect and rejection
of ECOSOC accreditation, NGO X might conclude that its
Conference application would also be rejected, and not bother to
apply at all.
The rejection of NGO X would be good for two main reasons:
(1) it would enhance the UN's stature as a body dedicated to the
principles and purposes enumerated in the UN Charter, and (2) it
would prevent an NGO with questionable credentials from
engaging in inappropriate behavior (e.g., spreading hate
propaganda and lobbying for the insertion of volatile, anti-U.S. or
anti-Israeli language in Conference/NGO Forum documents).
Moreover, the reformed system would have the effect of
eventually reducing the number of entrants into the ECOSOC-
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approved NGO universe. This in turn would reduce the NGO
Committee's workload and increase its ability to closely scrutinize
quadrennial NGO reviews.
B. Applying the NGO Complaint System
With a complaint system in place, there would be more
opportunities to place problematic NGOs on notice. NGO X can
be used as a hypothetical example under the new regime, assuming
that it had achieved special consultative status in the issue area of
human rights before the new accreditation reforms existed.
NGO X was a participant at the Durban conference. It
actively lobbied for language in the Forum documents stating that
Israel was an "apartheid and racist state." It urged that any
"Zionist" NGOs did not have a right to attend the Conference.
NGO X also passed out blatantly anti-Semitic pamphlets, banners,
and t-shirts at the Forum and Conference. Some of its members
disrupted a presentation by a Jewish NGO.
Jewish NGOs and Israel did not take these activities lightly. A
Jewish human rights organization with consultative status files a
complaint against NGO X, citing it for engaging in actions not
respectful of human rights or fundamental freedoms on the basis
of race and religion. The state of Israel also initiates a complaint,
mentioning NGO X's deviation from UN norms and for making
"unsubstantiated or politically motivated attacks" against Israel.
Both the Jewish NGO and Israel would have the right to file
complaints with DESA because they are respectively a
consultative-status NGO and a member state.
Next, the 10 investigates the allegations after five more
complaints are filed within the requisite time frame. An 10 official
interviews several Conference and Forum participants by phone,
who verify that NGO X's members disrupted a meeting and
passed out anti-Semitic items. Several NGOs send the 10 copies of
the literature. The 10 concludes that there is a reasonable basis for
NGO X's contravention of UN/ECOSOC norms, and makes a
recommendation of suspension to the NGO Committee.
Meanwhile, NGO X is notified of DESA's investigation and
recommendation. NGO X is given an opportunity to be heard. It
submits a general denial of the allegations. It argues that its attack
on Israel is not unsubstantiated, that apartheid exists in places like
Gaza and the West Bank, and that Israel treats Palestinians in a
racist manner.
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The stage is now set for a political controversy in the
nineteen-member NGO Committee. For many states, political
considerations take precedence over others. The four Muslim
states (Iran, Pakistan, Sudan, and Turkey) would likely side with a
fellow-Muslim NGO in any controversy involving Israel; Cuba
would also. The United States, France, and Germany would likely
vote for the suspension of NGO X.311 Other Committee members'
votes would be less predictable. China, India, and Russia might
choose abstention. 0 ' The West's position would prevail if at least
three of the remaining East European, Latin American, and
African nations voted against NGO X, with the rest abstaining like
China, India, and Russia. Thus, suspension would not be
guaranteed for NGO X, even in light of overwhelming facts
against NGO X.
All in all, the complaint system only might result in the
suspension or withdrawal of consultative status for an offender
NGO. The problem is politics. Many nations, especially those of
the developing world that hold views sympathetic to those of NGO
X, would choose politics over morality and reject accusations of
wrongdoing against NGO X. Because of this uncertainty in the
NGO Committee, complaints that would normally be strong
against NGOs like NGO X, would be unpredictable in the final
outcome. The complaint system would be helpful, but it would not
work with complete certainty. A great deal would depend on the
composition of the nineteen-member NGO Committee and the
NGO under review.
Stopping a problem NGO from initial accreditation would be
easier to do than suspending an NGO already in the ECOSOC
system. This is because state politics is less of a factor at DESA
than at the NGO Committee. Nonetheless, some NGOs-even
NGO X-could be still eliminated from time to time. A final
bonus of the complaint system is that it would eventually diminish
the overall number of consultative-status NGOs. This would in
306. This is based on the NGO Committee's 2000 decision (9-4-3) granting consultative
status to Hadassah, a Jewish service organization. The United States, France, Germany,
Romania, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ethiopia, and Turkey supported approval. Algeria,
Cuba, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Sudan voted against. China, India, and the Russian
Federation abstained. See Report of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations
on Its Resumed 2000 Session (New York, 15-26 Jantarv 2001), U.N. ESCOR, Resumed
2000 Sess., Agenda Item 2, at 7-8, U.N. Doc. E/2001/8 (2001).
307. See id.
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turn allow the NGO Committee to conduct more NGO reviews
and do a more thorough job.
C. Balancing Viewpoints
The hypothetical Conference would be divided into specific
issue areas, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, reparations for
descendants of slaves, and expanding anti-discrimination laws.
These issue areas would be further divided into pro and con
positions.
For example, on the topic of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
the Secretariat would invite oral comment from the two opposing
camps, one pro-Palestinian, the other pro-Israeli. As at the
Durban Conference, NGOs supporting the Palestinian cause
would likely outnumber those of the Israeli camp. Rather than
have hundreds of NGOs speak out on just one side of an issue, the
Conference would invite two or three principal NGOs to present
comments to the Conference on opposing sides of an issue.
Perhaps a new umbrella group, NGO "P," would be formed to
pool resources and voices to represent hundreds of pro-Palestinian
NGOs that could not adequately present their views otherwise.
The umbrella group would be a "voice multiplier."
Similarly, NGO "I" would represent several Jewish or pro-
Israeli organizations. A maximum of six groups would thus address
the Conference, including NGOs P and I. The non-umbrella
groups would be established major organizations with
international visibility and stature.
The balancing of viewpoints would make for a better
Conference. Issue positions would be better developed, as the six
NGOs would have more time to present their arguments. This
would be unlike the Durban Conference, where sound bites were
the rule and statements were brief due to the volume of
participants. Equal time would be given to both views,
guaranteeing fairness to opposing views. It would not give the
impression that all of global civil society supported the Palestinian
cause, as was the case at Durban. Some NGOs might be
disgruntled because they were prevented from speaking to the
Conference. They would have the opportunity to submit amicus
briefs, however, and to speak out during the Forum proceedings.
In addition, a more limited pool of testifying NGOs would
give state delegates an in-depth understanding of the conflict.
Thus, it would help state delegates better formulate a well-
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rounded final declaration and program of action. The intolerant
policies of the Palestinian Authority and the human rights
violations of suicide bombers would be given public treatment on
an equal basis with Israeli rights violations.
D. No NGOs on State Delegations
NGO representatives would not be permitted on state
delegations at the future WCAR. This reform is necessary in light
of instances of NGO-delegation dominance at recent world
conferences. This would prevent, for example, accredited NGO
"Y," a U.S. civil-rights NGO advocating the national and
international expansion of affirmative-action laws, from placing
members on a U.S. (or other) delegation. Similarly, accredited
U.S. NGO "Z," favoring a contraction of affirmative-action laws,
would be proscribed from having representatives on a U.S.
conference delegation. The result: (1) no single outside-induced
ideological perspective would dominate delegation discussions; (2)
states would be more inclined to accept different points of view,
rather than just an NGO "Y" or NGO "Z" view; and (3) the risk
of capture would be reduced significantly.
Both NGO Y and NGO Z would be free to participate like
other NGOs at the PrepComs, the Forum, and Conference. They
could be part of umbrella groups, submit amicus briefs, observe
proceedings, etc. They just would not be part of national
delegations. Conversely, states would still be able to seek the
counsel and input of NGOs, just not as an integral part of the
delegation. State primacy would be ensured.
E. Limiting Financial Contributions
Assume a major reduction in financial support at WCAR
20XX in the amount of twenty-five percent. This would affect the
Conference in many ways. First, the length and scope of the
Conference would be reduced. Instead of a nine-day conference
like Durban, WCAR 20XX would be a six or seven-day event.
Regional PrepComs would probably have to be cut from four to
three. Second, the PrepCom and Conference agendas would be
trimmed down and less ambitious. Core issues would be
emphasized over more peripheral matters.
Third, with a slimmed-down agenda and smaller meeting
halls, NGOs would participate in fewer numbers than at Durban.
Larger, more mainstream NGOs would be in attendance, while
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smaller groups would be less inclined to show up. Arguably,
thousands of NGOs might still attend the parallel Forum, as the
UN would not have direct control over the parallel proceedings.
An NGO would have to do a cost-benefit analysis and determine
whether it would be worthwhile to devote limited resources to a
conference of reduced scope and stature, especially when
compared to the massive Durban Conference. Amicus briefs might
be a better alternative for some NGOs instead of actual
attendance.
Fourth, a smaller gathering would be more manageable from
a security perspective. Mobs and demonstrators would be easier to
handle, and fewer disruptions would occur. Finally, the smaller the
conference, the lesser the media attention. Media reports of
protests and hateful sloganeering would be bad for the
Conference. Reports of thoughtful deliberations and progress
being made on important social issues would be good, but reports
of this nature tend to be buried in the back pages of national and
international newspapers.
Therefore, financial cutbacks would merely result in a scaled-
back Conference agenda and fewer NGOs present. Significant
work could still be achieved, and the Conference would be more
manageable and effective.
F. Adding Amicus Briefs
If WCAR 20XX would employ the new amicus system, NGOs
would now have a choice, to make oral presentations to PrepComs
or the Conference, or submit amici. For example, NGO Y, the
civil-rights organization, may decide to exercise a combination of
both. It submits amici to the several PrepComs and provides oral
testimony at the actual Conference.
NGO Y would submit three different amicus briefs on time
prior to each of the three PrepComs. Each brief will meet the ten-
page limit required by new ECOSOC standards. Then the briefs
are forwarded to the respective Selection Subcommittees.
The Selection Subcommittees, three for the PrepComs and
one for the Conference, are each composed of two state members
and the Conference secretary. The state members are composed of
one delegate from the North and one from the South.
The respective Subcommittees examine each of NGO Y's
briefs. The briefs are evaluated for compliance with the three
submission criteria: the NGO's interest, its competence, and
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document relevance. NGO Y was formed to achieve social justice
and promote civil rights for underrepresented minority groups. It
fulfills the interest prong. NGO Y also meets the competence
factor, as it is active in lobbying, education, and promoting civil
rights for several decades. It satisfies the last prong, as its amici
concern the topic of strategies to achieve full and effective equality
of all people-an issue addressed by the Conference. NGO Y is
considered by most, including those on the Selection
Subcommittee, to be a mainstream group. All the briefs are
accepted by the PrepComs.
NGO Y can submit the briefs in lieu of making oral
statements at the three PrepComs. This is beneficial to NGO Y
because it has chosen to only attend one PrepCom, and its views
will still be communicated to the other two PrepComs via its
amicus.
For the WCAR, NGO Y can send several representatives to
testify orally on the topic of achieving equal opportunity for all.
Oral testimony is a good way to make a more memorable
impression on the state delegates at the Conference in a public
setting.
There could be instances where an NGO's brief would be
rejected, particularly if all of the prongs of the submission test are
not met. But this would likely happen in only rare cases.
Regarding the competence factor, all accredited NGOs already
meet this criterion. NGOs need to be competent in a particular
area in order to receive consultative status or Conference
accreditation. The interest factor is easily fulfilled because a group
merely needs to have some sort of legitimate concern for the
subject at issue. The relevance factor also has a low threshold for
acceptance. The brief simply has to relate to a matter being
addressed by a conference.
The risk of veto by countries on a political basis would be
minimal. For example, a Subcommittee member from a
developing-world dictatorship could not veto a brief from a civil
rights group like NGO Y or Human Rights Watch. This is because
the votes of the other two delegates, one by the North, such as an
EU member, and the other by the Conference secretary, would
override the South's vote.
All in all, the amicus system would appear to work. NGOs
would be able to make useful contributions to PrepComs and the
conference whether they are present or not. NGOs need not send
[Vol. 26:217
NGOs at U.N.-Sponsored World Conferences
representatives to every PrepCom because they can submit briefs
instead. This would reduce costs for NGOs. The acceptance
criteria are very lenient, so the vast majority of submissions would
be accepted by the Selection Subcommittee. Finally, the system
has a check-and-balance, in the form of the tripartite membership
of the Selection Subcommittee, to ensure fundamental fairness and
limit the intrusion of politics in the selection process.
G. From Declaration Through Follow-Up
The NGO Declaration and Program of Action would likely
be much more toned down than that produced at the Durban
Conference. Many NGOs that do not adhere to UN norms would
have been screened out before achieving consultative status or
Conference accreditation. Some NGOs would have been
suspended after 10 investigations revealed patterns of improper
activity. All of these screening efforts would reduce instances of
boisterous demonstrations and acts of intimidation or insensitivity
by some NGOs and their supporters. A more responsible NGO
gathering would result. This would translate into a more
thoughtful and less vitriolic Forum and final documents.
For a number of reasons, the final Declaration and Program
of Action at WCAR 20XX would be less one-sided and
impractical than that of the Durban Conference. Lack of NGO
participation on state delegations would reduce the risk of capture.
The scaled-back scope of the Conference would enable states and
the Secretariat to manage and control NGO testimony before
committees more effectively. Finally, through viewpoint balancing,
racial discrimination and intolerance in closed societies would be
exposed.
For example, the discriminatory policies of Arab nations
would be covered by the Conference along with allegations of
Israeli abuses in the West Bank. Israel would not be singled out.
Therefore, the agenda of the Conference and the final Conference
documents would be more balanced and fair. Important players
like the United States and West European nations would be
disinclined to walk out or reject the Declaration and Program of
Action. Finally, a more pragmatic Program of Action would result
in the actual implementation of proposed actions through follow-
up by states, something that did not take place after Durban.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The six-factor reform approach would be a substantial
improvement over the current UN system governing NGOs, as
seen by the hypothetical application of the new approach. NGO
excesses would be reduced without restraining the ability of NGOs
to participate in a meaningful way at UN conferences. The
likelihood of radical programs of action would be lessened. The
primacy of states would be assured. The reputation of the UN, as a
sponsor of international conferences, would be enhanced. All of
this would be accomplished through fairness in tackling issues of
world concern, and in formulating solutions with the cooperation
of global civil society.
The new approach rectifies many flaws that exist in
ECOSOC's management of NGO participation, while at the same
time addressing many of the concerns broached by the
Accommodationist and Restrictionist schools. Both schools'
worries about lack of NGO accountability are partly solved by the
NGO accreditation screening and complaint reforms.
Troublesome NGOs would be prevented from becoming part of
the UN conference system. The posting of NGO data on the
Internet would especially promote transparency. Restrictionists
would be pleased by the stifling of radical NGO agendas and the
reassertion of state primacy. Radical programs of action would be
constrained through viewpoint balancing at committee and
conference meetings and the vetting of problematic NGOs. Lastly,
state primacy would be helped by ending the practice of NGO
participation in state delegations.
Keeping in mind that the relationship between the UN and
NGOs is a consultative one under Article 71, the new approach
would preserve the ability of NGOs to consult with UN
conferences through actual attendance or the submission of amicus
briefs. Although Accommodationists would be disheartened by
not granting NGOs legal personality or inclusion on state
delegations, this is not the role envisioned by the founding UN
Charter. This new approach would ultimately improve the UN's
image and the productive output of world conferences.
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